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Obviousness as Fact: The Issue of 
Obviousness in Patent Law Should Be a 
Question of Fact Reviewed with 
Appropriate Deference 
Ted L. Field* 
One of the most common defenses that an accused infringer raises in 
a patent infringement lawsuit is that the patent claims at issue are 
invalid for obviousness. The question of obviousness is based on several 
factual determinations, and the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit should sensibly review these 
determinations with deference to the jury’s or trial court’s findings. But 
these courts instead treat the ultimate determination of obviousness as a 
question of law to be reviewed de novo. This Article challenges the cor-
rectness of this standard of review and argues that courts should treat 
the ultimate determination of obviousness as a question of fact reviewed 
with appropriate deference. The Article considers several theoretical and 
practical reasons that support this argument. The Article concludes: (1) 
based on general policy considerations concerning standards of review, 
obviousness should be a question of fact; (2) the precedent on which the 
courts have relied in determining the standard of review for obviousness 
does not support the conclusion that obviousness is a question of law; (3) 
the treatment of obviousness as a question of law is inconsistent with the 
Federal Circuit’s treatment of analogous issues in patent law; and (4) 
based on an examination of recent case law, the Federal Circuit almost 
always treats obviousness as a de facto question of fact even though it is a 
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de jure question of law. Thus, this Article concludes that the Supreme 
Court should hold that the ultimate issue of obviousness is properly a 
question of fact to be reviewed with appropriate deference. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Standards of review are crucially important in appeals.1 And the 
judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit2 take 
                                                                                                                            
1 1 STEPHEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ix (3d ed. 1999) (“[S]tandards of review are the essential language of appeals.”); Kelly 
Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 11, 12 
(1994) (“[A]s a concept, [the standard of review] is essential to every appellate court 
decision. It is to the appellate court what the burden of proof is to the trial court.”); Paul 
R. Michel, Appellate Advocacy—One Judge’s Point of View, 1 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 2 (1991) 
(“Standards of review . . . influence the disposition of appeals far more than many 
advocates realize.”); Peter Nicolas, De Novo Review in Deferential Robes?: A Deconstruction 
of the Standard of Review of Evidentiary Errors in the Federal System, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
531, 531 (2004) (“In federal appellate practice, the standard of review is the name of the 
game.”); Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 234 (2009) (“Standards of review play a critical role in the 
appellate decision-making process . . . .”); cf. FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(B) (requiring the 
appellant’s brief to contain “for each issue, a concise statement of the applicable standard 
of review”). Indeed, a standard of review “is often ‘outcome determinative,’ in the sense 
that the difference between victory and defeat on appeal can turn on whether the standard 
by which the appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision on an issue is plenary or 
deferential.” Nicolas, supra. 
2 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982 and has 
“exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of patent decisions of the district courts.” Ted L. 
Field, Improving the Federal Circuit’s Approach to Choice of Law for Procedural Matters in 
Patent Cases, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 643, 643 (2009). One of Congress’s important goals 
in taking patent appeals out of the regional circuits and placing them in the newly created 
Federal Circuit was “to bring national uniformity to patent law.” Id. at 643–44. The 
Federal Circuit also hears appeals from denials of patent grants by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office. Id. at 643 n.2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2000)). “Moreover, 
‘[p]artly out of recognition of the dangers of specialization,’ [Congress] ‘supplemented 
[the Federal Circuit’s] jurisdiction with adjudicatory authority in such diverse areas as 
trademark, tariff and customs law, technology transfer regulations, and government 
contract and labor disputes.’” Id. (first and third alterations in original) (quoting Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (1989)). 
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standards of review seriously.3 For example, according to retired 
Judge Paul R. Michel4 of the Federal Circuit, “[s]tandards of re-
view . . . influence the disposition of appeals far more than many 
advocates realize.”5 Judge Michel further characterized “a clear 
statement [in a brief as to] why the standard of review is met or is 
not met” as “a likely ‘pivot point’ in deciding the appeal.”6 Judge 
Michel has noted: 
[I]n all appeals, the controlling question for us is al-
ways the same: Did the trial court commit reversible 
error? Not just any error, but . . . most of all, error 
that meets the relevant standards of review. . . . And 
always, we view the alleged error through the lens of 
the standard of review.7 
A “standard of review is the criterion by which the decision of 
a lower tribunal will be measured by a higher tribunal to determine 
its correctness or propriety.”8 Thus, a standard of review defines 
the amount of deference that a reviewing court gives to a lower tri-
bunal’s decision.9 And a standard of review defines “[w]hat is ne-
                                                                                                                            
3 See Michel, supra note 1, at 2 (describing the importance of standards of review to 
the decision-making process of the Federal Circuit); see also Kevin Casey et al., Standards 
of Appellate Review in the Federal Circuit: Substance and Semantics, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 
280 (2002) (“[S]tandards of review involve complex and subtle questions of both law and 
tactics, which often impact the appeal more than the facts and the substantive law issues 
upon which advocates spend so much time and effort.”); Charles W. Shifley, The Three 
Stages to Successful Appellate Advocacy Before the Federal Circuit, 1 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 238, 244 (2002) (“No appeal will have success unless the standard(s) of 
review [are] identified and appreciated.”). 
4 Paul Michel served as a judge on the Federal Circuit from 1988 through 2010. 
History of the Federal Judiciary: Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1633&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na [https:// 
perma.cc/6CDN-7C9D] (last visited Feb. 24, 2017). He served as Chief Judge from 2004 
through 2010, and then retired from the court. Id. 
5 Michel, supra note 1, at 2. 
6 Id. at 6. 
7 Id. at 2. 
8 Kunsch, supra note 1, at 15; see also Richard H.W. Maloy, ‘Standards of Review’—
Just a Tip of the Icicle, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 603, 604 (2000) (defining “standard of 
review” as “the limits of review, or the extent to which, and the manner by which, a court 
of review will scrutinize the findings of fact, conclusions of law, or rulings of a trial 
court”). 
9 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 1.01, at 1-2; Kunsch, supra note 1, at 14. 
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cessary to overturn the decision” being appealed.10 Standards of 
review serve other important purposes too: they “enhance judicial 
economy, standardize the appellate process, and give the parties in 
a lawsuit an idea of their chance of success on appeal.”11 
But there is at least one more important function of standards 
of review: they “balance the power among the courts.”12 Indeed, 
“the fundamental notion behind a standard of review is that of de-
fining the relationship and power shared among judicial bodies.”13 
Standards of review that allow an appellate court to give less defe-
rence to a decision of a trial court necessarily give more power to 
the appellate court relative to the trial court than standards of re-
view that are more deferential. Thus, the way in which the appel-
late court establishes standards of review for various issues is re-
lated to how much power the court has. Significantly, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has recently recognized the importance of the stan-
dards of review that the Federal Circuit applies in patent cases by 
altering the Federal Circuit’s standards of review in two cases since 
2014.14 
Commentators have accused the Federal Circuit of generally 
exercising too much power relative to that of the district courts in 
patent cases.15 One particular way in which the Federal Circuit has 
                                                                                                                            
10 Kunsch, supra note 1, at 14. 
11 Peters, supra note 1, at 238. 
12 Id. 
13 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 1.01, at 1-3. 
14 See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015) (holding that 
the clearly erroneous standard applies for subsidiary facts in claim construction instead of 
the de novo standard); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 
1749 (2014) (holding that the abuse of discretion standard applies for the determination of 
whether a case is “exceptional” in awarding attorney fees instead of the de novo 
standard). 
15 See, e.g., Ted L. Field, Hyperactive Judges: An Empirical Study of Judge-Dependent 
“Judicial Hyperactivity” in the Federal Circuit, 38 VT. L. REV. 625, 640–44 (2014) 
[hereinafter Field, Hyperactive Judges] (describing criticisms by commentators of the 
Federal Circuit’s “judicial hyperactivity”); Ted L. Field, “Judicial Hyperactivity” in the 
Federal Circuit: An Empirical Study, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 721, 721–23 (2012) [hereinafter 
Field, Judicial Hyperactivity] (same); Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal 
Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1830–36 (2013) (describing how the Federal Circuit 
has enhanced its power in patent law relative to the power of the district courts); Mark A. 
Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1735 n.279 
(2013) (“The Federal Circuit has been criticized for usurping the district court’s fact-
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been accused of exercising such excessive power is by applying 
standards of review that are not sufficiently deferential.16 In partic-
ular, many commentators have criticized the court’s longtime prac-
tice of treating the issue of claim construction17 as a pure question 
of law and reviewing decisions on claim construction without defe-
rence.18 Indeed, the Federal Circuit originally decided en banc that 
                                                                                                                            
finding role.” (citing Field, Judicial Hyperactivity, supra, at 723; William C. Rooklidge & 
Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal Circuit’s Discomfort with Its Appellate 
Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 726 (2000))); Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: 
Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 883 (2002) (“Ignoring 
conventional allocation-of-power principles that give trial courts primary authority over 
factual questions, the Federal Circuit has asserted power over fact.”); Rooklidge & Weil, 
supra (describing criticisms by commentators of the Federal Circuit’s “judicial 
hyperactivity”); John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The 
Place of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 183, 209–10 
(1999) (“Seeking to expand its ability to regulate patent infringement disputes, the 
Federal Circuit sought an interpretive strategy that would provide it with unrestrained 
powers of review.”). 
16 Gugliuzza, supra note 15, at 1831 (“[T]he court has shaped patent law’s standards of 
appellate review to give itself plenary power to resolve many important substantive 
[patent-law] issues . . . .In patent cases, the Federal Circuit has cast many important 
issues as questions of law, rather than questions of fact, enhancing the court’s authority 
over district courts.”). 
17 The Patent Act requires that the specification of every patent must “conclude with 
one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter 
which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) 
(2012). “A patent claim is a single-sentence definition of the scope of the patent owner’s 
property right—that is, her right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to 
sell, or importing the invention, in this country, during the term of the patent.” JANICE 
M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 78 (4th ed. 2013). The claim describes the “metes and 
bounds” of the invention. Id. “Claim construction” or “claim interpretation” is the 
process by which a court interprets the meaning of the claim terms in a particular patent. 
See id. at 447–65. Claim construction can be “the single most important event in the 
course of a patent litigation.” Id. at 447 (quoting Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, 
Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc)). 
18 See, e.g., Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim 
Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1113 (2001) (linking the Federal 
Circuit’s high reversal rate with the de novo standard of review for claim construction 
decisions); Field, Judicial Hyperactivity, supra note 15, at 733 (“Commentators have 
accused the Federal Circuit of overstepping its proper appellate role by reviewing claim 
construction decisions de novo instead of giving deference to the claim construction 
decisions of the district courts.”); Rai, supra note 15, at 883 (“Ignoring conventional 
allocation-of-power principles that give trial courts primary authority over factual 
questions, the Federal Circuit has asserted power over fact. In the context of claim 
construction, it has done so simply by declaring claim construction to be a pure question 
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claim construction was a pure question of law to be reviewed de 
novo in the 1998 case Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.19 And 
despite criticism of this decision,20 the Federal Circuit in 2014 reaf-
firmed the Cybor Corp. standard en banc, holding that it would con-
tinue to review claim-construction decisions with no deference.21 
But in the 2015 case Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, 
Inc.,22 the Supreme Court, recognizing the importance of this is-
sue,23 overturned the Federal Circuit’s practice of reviewing claim-
construction decisions with no deference.24 In Teva, the Court be-
gan by observing that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)25 re-
quires all courts of appeals to review factual determinations made 
by judges using the clearly erroneous standard.26 The Court rea-
soned that no exception to this rule should apply for the review of 
                                                                                                                            
of law subject to de novo review.”); Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 15, at 748 (“[B]y 
confirming that claim construction is an issue of law for the court to decide, the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Markman v. Westview Instruments plainly hastened the Federal Circuit’s 
move toward greater involvement as an appellate tribunal in the sorts of de novo review 
that have tempted the court to take on the role of advocate.”); Thomas Chen, Note, 
Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1180 
(2008) (“[A]ppellate review of claim construction would greatly benefit from a more 
deferential approach that simply assesses whether the district court derived a reasonable 
claim interpretation, in place of the currently inefficient pursuit of a single best answer.”). 
19 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
20 See Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 
1296 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (“District judges, both parties 
in this case, and the majority of intellectual property lawyers and academics around the 
country will no doubt be surprised by today’s majority opinion [reaffirming Cybor]—and 
for good reason.”). 
21 Id. at 1292 (majority opinion). 
22 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). 
23 Id. at 836 (noting that the Court “believe[s] it important to clarify the standard of 
review” that the Federal Circuit must apply in reviewing claim construction decisions). 
24 Id. at 835 (holding that the Federal Circuit “must apply a ‘clear error,’ not a de novo, 
standard of review” when it reviews the factual underpinnings of a claim construction 
decision). The Court’s holding did not come as a surprise to commentators. See, e.g., 
Dennis Crouch, Supreme Court to Consider De Novo Review of Claim Construction, 
PATENTLY-O (Mar. 31, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/03/supreme-consider-
construction.html [https://perma.cc/WR52-HNNF] (“I’ll speculate here that the result 
will be a unanimous rejection of the Federal Circuit’s no deference policy.”). 
25 For a discussion of how the Federal Circuit applies rule 52(a) in the context of 
reviewing an obviousness determination, see infra text accompanying notes 202–15. 
26 Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 836. 
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factual underpinnings in claim-construction decisions.27 The Court 
then noted that both “precedent” and “practical considerations 
favor clear error review.”28 The Court rejected arguments to the 
contrary29 and held that the Federal Circuit must review the factual 
underpinnings involved in a claim-construction decision for clear 
error.30 The Court thus effectively overruled the Federal Circuit’s 
decisions in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.31 and Lighting Bal-
last Control LLC v. Philips Electronics North American Corp.32 to 
treat claim construction as a pure question of law to be reviewed de 
novo. 
Further underscoring the importance of standards of review in 
patent cases, the Supreme Court in 2014 overruled the Federal 
Circuit’s practice of using a non-deferential standard of review in 
an area of patent law involving attorney fees. Under § 285 of the 
Patent Act, a party is entitled to an award of attorney fees if the 
case is “exceptional.”33 In Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Man-
agement System, Inc.,34 the Court considered the propriety of the 
Federal Circuit’s practice of reviewing a district court’s determina-
tion as to whether a case is “exceptional”35 without deference.36 
The Court considered the text of the statute and held that it “em-
                                                                                                                            
27 Id. at 837. The Court implicitly recognized that even if “convincing ground[s]” for 
an exception existed, the Court likely lacked the power to create such an exception to a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. See id. (“Even if exceptions to the Rule were 
permissible, we cannot find any convincing ground for creating an exception to that Rule 
here.”). In a dissent authored by Justice Thomas and joined by Justice Alito, Justice 
Thomas disagreed that rule 52(a) should apply to the review of claim-construction 
decisions. Id. at 844–45 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Thomas reasoned 
that any apparent “subsidiary evidentiary findings” should properly subsumed into the 
overall question of law presented by a claim-construction decision. Id. at 845–53. 
28 Id. at 838–39 (majority opinion). 
29 Id. at 839–42. 
30 Id. at 835. 
31 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
32 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
33 Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755–56 
(2014) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012)). 
34 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
35 As the Supreme Court held in Octane Fitness in 2015, “an ‘exceptional’ case is 
simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a 
party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or 
the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.” 134 S. Ct. at 1756. 
36 Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1746–47. 
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phasizes the fact that the determination [of whether a case is ex-
ceptional] is for the district court, which suggests some deference 
to the district court upon appeal.”37 The Court also noted that “as 
a matter of the sound administration of justice, the district court is 
better positioned to decide whether a case is exceptional because it 
lives with the case over a prolonged period of time.”38 Finally, the 
court reasoned that “the question is multifarious and novel, not 
susceptible to useful generalization of the sort that de novo review 
provides, and likely to profit from the experience that an abuse-of- 
discretion rule will permit to develop.”39 Thus, the Court held that 
the Federal Circuit must abandon its practice of reviewing this is-
sue de novo and instead “apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in 
reviewing all aspects of a district court’s . . . determination” as to 
whether a case is “exceptional.”40 
The importance of standards of review in patent litigation, as 
shown by the Supreme Court’s recent attention to standards of re-
view applied by Federal Circuit, gives rise to this question: In what 
other areas of patent law does the Federal Circuit currently apply 
non-deferential review where instead the court should really be ap-
plying a deferential standard of review? This Article explores an 
answer to this question for one particular area of the law: invalidi-
ty41 due to obviousness.42 The Supreme Court and Federal Circuit 
currently review the ultimate decision that a patent is or is not 
invalid due to obviousness with no deference.43 This Article pro-
                                                                                                                            
37 Id. at 1748 (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559 (1988)). 
38 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 559–60). 
39 Id. at 1748–49 (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 562). 
40 Id. 
41 In a patent infringement lawsuit, an accused infringer can raise the affirmative 
defense of invalidity. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)–(3) (2012). In bringing an invalidity 
defense, the accused infringer asserts that one or more of the asserted patent claims are 
invalid for failure to satisfy any of the patentability requirements, such as patent-eligible 
subject matter, utility, novelty, and nonobviousness. MUELLER, supra note 17, at 582. And 
once a court declares that a patent claim is invalid, the patent owner is precluded from 
asserting that claim against any other infringer. Id. at 581 (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., 
Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971)). Thus, the effect of an invalidity 
determination is that the claim “is dead and cannot be resuscitated.” Id. 
42 For a discussion of the issue of invalidity due to obviousness, see infra Section I.B. 
43 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966); Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. 
Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987). For a discussion of the Federal Circuit’s 
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poses that the obviousness determination should be reviewed as a 
question of fact44—thus, for clear error45 in a bench trial,46 and for 
substantial evidence47 in a jury trial.48 
The most commonly litigated invalidity defense in patent-
infringement lawsuits is obviousness.49 The obviousness determi-
nation is governed by § 103 of the Patent Act,50 under which a pa-
tent claim is invalid “if the differences between the claimed inven-
tion and the prior art51 are such that the claimed invention as a 
whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of 
the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to 
which the claimed invention pertains.”52 The Supreme Court has 
held that the obviousness analysis involves four factual determina-
tions, known as the “Graham factors”: “(1) level of ordinary skill 
in the art; (2) scope and content of the prior art; (3) differences be-
tween the claimed invention and the prior art; and (4) secondary 
                                                                                                                            
reasoning behind its holding that obviousness is a question of law, reviewed de novo, see 
infra Section I.C. 
44 This Article does not analyze the related, though different, issue of whether the 
question of obviousness is more properly a decision to be made by the court and never a 
jury. For a recent and thorough treatment of this separate issue, see generally Lemley, 
supra note 15. 
45 See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (requiring a “clearly erroneous” standard of review with 
respect to the findings of fact in a bench trial). For a discussion of the clearly erroneous 
standard, see infra Section I.A.2. 
46 Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
47 See Kunsch, supra note 1, at 24 (“Facts found by a jury are reviewed with the 
common law ‘substantial evidence’ test.” (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 
80 (1942))). For a discussion of the substantial-evidence standard, see infra Section I.A.3. 
48 Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark Pharm. Inc., USA, 748 F.3d 1354, 
1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
49 See Matthew Beutler, How a Comparative Analysis of Federal Circuit Standards of 
Review Supports Limiting the Role of Juries in Determinations of Obviousness, 92 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 451, 453 (2010) (“[T]he question of obviousness is so frequently 
found at the center of disputes concerning patents in both pre-issuance patent 
procurement as well as post-issuance patent enforcement.”). For a more detailed 
discussion of the obviousness defense, see infra Section I.B. 
50 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
51 “[P]rior art can be understood at a very basic level as the legally available technology 
and information with which the claimed invention will be compared in order to determine 
whether that invention is patentable.” MUELLER, supra note 17, at 284. The exact 
requirements for a particular piece of technology or information to be considered prior art 
are defined by the statute. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
52 § 103. 
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considerations (i.e., objective indicia of nonobviousness).”53 After 
making findings as to these factors, the decision maker must then 
determine whether the claimed invention would have been obvious 
to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing 
date.54 Importantly, the obviousness determination is objective be-
cause it requires analysis of obviousness with respect to a hypothet-
ical third party—the hypothetical “person having ordinary skill in 
the art to which the claimed invention pertains.”55 
Although the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit classify this 
ultimate determination of obviousness as one of law reviewed 
without deference,56 this Article proposes that it should properly 
be classified as one of fact and reviewed with deference for the fol-
lowing reasons: 
 The Federal Circuit’s reasoning that the 
ultimate question of obviousness is really a 
question of law rather than a question of fact is 
flawed;57 
 The Supreme Court’s statement that the 
ultimate question of obviousness is one of law 
was never properly supported by precedent;58 
 Treating obviousness as a question of law is 
inconsistent with how the Federal Circuit treats 
other analogous patent-law issues, such as 
anticipation and infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents;59 and 
 Even though under current law obviousness is 
supposed to be a question of law, district courts 
nonetheless treat the issue as a de facto question 
of fact, without the objection of the Federal 
Circuit.60 
                                                                                                                            
53 MUELLER, supra note 17, at 279. 
54 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
55 § 103; see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). 
56 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17; Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 
(Fed. Cir. 1987). 
57 For a discussion of this issue, see infra Section I.A. 
58 For a discussion of this issue, see infra Section I.B. 
59 For a discussion of this issue, see infra Section I.C. 
60 For a discussion of this issue, see infra Section I.D. 
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For these reasons, in an appropriate case, the Supreme Court 
should hold that the ultimate determination of obviousness is a 
question of fact to be reviewed as such. 
Part I begins with a description of standards of review and the 
difference between questions of law and fact. Part II discusses the 
two invalidity defenses based on the prior art—anticipation and 
obviousness. Part III then describes in detail why the ultimate ques-
tion of obviousness should properly be a question of fact and re-
viewed by the Federal Circuit with deference. 
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND QUESTIONS OF LAW AND 
FACT 
This Part provides background information regarding standards 
of review and questions of law and fact. Section I.A discusses the 
different standards of review that are applied by the Federal Cir-
cuit. Section I.B discusses how reviewing courts in general decide 
whether an issue is a question of law versus a questions of fact. 
A. The Federal Circuit’s Standards of Review 
A standard of review “prescribes the degree of deference given 
by the reviewing court to the actions or decisions under review.”61 
Further, it is “the criterion by which the decision of a lower tribun-
al will be measured by a higher tribunal to determine its correctness 
or propriety.”62 In essence, a standard of review defines “[w]hat is 
necessary to overturn the decision” being appealed.63 It is—
perhaps surprisingly—a relatively new concept in appellate juri-
sprudence.64 But the standard of review has become vitally impor-
tant in appellate decision-making at the Federal Circuit.65 The 
                                                                                                                            
61 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 1.01, at 1-2. 
62 Kunsch, supra note 1, at 15. 
63 Id. at 14. 
64 Peters, supra note 1, at 237–38. Indeed, “[t]hough the language for modern-day 
standards of review can be traced to early American opinions, the concept of standards of 
review was not firmly rooted in opinions until the latter part of the twentieth century.” Id. 
at 237. 
65 See Michel, supra note 1, at 2 (describing the importance of standards of review to 
the decision-making process of the Federal Circuit); see also Casey et al., supra note 3, at 
280 (“[S]tandards of review involve complex and subtle questions of both law and tactics, 
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Federal Circuit uses four basic standards in reviewing district-court 
decisions: (1) de novo; (2) clear error; (3) substantial evidence; and 
(4) abuse of discretion.66 The following sections discuss each of 
these standards in turn. 
1. De Novo 
The least deferential standard used by the Federal Circuit is the 
de novo standard.67 Where the court reviews an issue under the de 
novo standard, it “gives the trial tribunal little, if any, defe-
rence.”68 Indeed, the decision under review “receives little or no 
presumption of correctness.”69 In applying the de novo standard, 
the court “must exercise its independent judgment on the evidence 
of record and [weigh] it as a trial court” would.70 Although the de 
novo standard does not require the court to give any deference to 
the decision it is reviewing, nonetheless, the court is “not . . . re-
                                                                                                                            
which often impact the appeal more than the facts and the substantive law issues upon 
which advocates spend so much time and effort.”); Shifley, supra note 3, at 244 (“No 
appeal will have success unless the standard(s) of review [are] identified and 
appreciated.”); cf. Bryan Adamson, All Facts Are Not Created Equal, 13 TEMP. POL. & 
C.R. L. REV. 629, 629 (2004) (“It is no exaggeration to say that classifying a trial court’s 
findings as findings of fact, findings of law, or mixed questions of law and fact can dictate 
the outcome on appeal.”). 
66 Casey et al., supra note 3, at 285–86. Where reviewing cases from various agency 
tribunals—as opposed to district courts—the Federal Circuit uses standards of review in 
addition to these four, such as the “arbitrary or capricious” standard. Id. at 287. But this 
Article focuses exclusively on the Federal Circuit’s review of patent decisions made by 
district courts, not on its review of agency determinations. 
67 The Federal Circuit sometimes uses the term “without deference” for the de novo 
standard of review. See, e.g., Synqor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 709 F.3d 1365, 1373 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (“On the issue of obviousness, this court reviews . . . the ultimate 
conclusion of obviousness without deference.”). The court also sometimes refers to de 
novo review as “plenary review.” See, e.g., Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 
1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 is also a question 
of law subject to plenary review.”). 
68 Casey et al., supra note 3, at 285; see also Kunsch, supra note 1, at 37 (defining de 
novo review as where a “reviewing court makes an original appraisal of all the evidence to 
decide whether or not it believes [the conclusions of the trial court]” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 n.31 
(1984))). 
69 Casey et al., supra note 3, at 285. 
70 SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 381 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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quired to ignore the decision below.”71 The court applies the de 
novo standard to issues that the court defines as purely legal.72 
2. Clear Error 
In contrast to the de novo standard, the Federal Circuit must 
give at least some deference to a district-court judge’s factual find-
ings in a review under the clearly erroneous standard.73 This stan-
dard is required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which 
provides: “Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evi-
dence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .”74 The 
Supreme Court has defined a finding as “clearly erroneous” where 
“although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on 
the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed.”75 The Seventh Circuit has put a 
colorful gloss on this definition, which emphasizes the great degree 
of deference this standard requires: “To be clearly erroneous, a 
decision must strike us as more than just maybe or probably wrong; 
it must, as one member of this court recently stated during oral ar-
gument, strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unre-
frigerated dead fish.”76 
Although it is deferential, the clearly erroneous standard is 
nonetheless lenient.77 The issue under the clearly erroneous stan-
dard is not whether a particular finding is actually correct in the 
opinion of the Federal Circuit; instead, the issue is whether the 
finding was “clearly wrong.”78 Thus, in some cases, the clearly er-
                                                                                                                            
71 Id. Thus, under the de novo standard, although the court in theory reviews a 
decision without any deference, “[i]n practice . . . the trial tribunal’s decision will at least 
have a subtle effect.” Casey et al., supra note 3, at 290. Indeed, the court may be 
influenced by “the persuasive force of a well-written trial tribunal opinion, which reasons 
forcefully and examines deftly the law and precedent” even under the de novo standard. 
Id. 
72 Casey et al., supra note 3, at 289–90. 
73 Id. at 286. 
74 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). 
75 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
76 Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988); 
Casey et al., supra note 3, at 299 n.81 (quoting Parts & Elec. Motors, 866 F.2d at 233). 
77 Casey et al., supra note 3, at 299. 
78 Id. 
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roneous standard binds the Federal Circuit to affirm a finding of 
fact even if it “would also have affirmed [a] contrary finding[].”79 
An important policy rationale for requiring that a reviewing 
court defer to a district court’s factual findings is that the district-
court judge is “in a better position to make findings on the issue” 
in question.80 Indeed, as one commentator has explained: 
[A district court judge is] present throughout the 
entire course of the trial. [The judge] can observe 
first-hand the demeanor of each witness and thereby 
determine each witness’ credibility. [The judge] 
spend[s] more time with the facts and parties of the 
case so [the judge] generally [has] a better under-
standing of the context within which an issue aris-
es.81 
Other important policy rationales for deference relate to “the 
judicial system and what such deference does for the system it-
self.”82 One important such institutional rationale is that of finality: 
“The more deference given to the decision of the lower tribunal, 
the less likely the losing party is to appeal that decision.”83 This 
rationale also leads to the idea that such finality will reduce court 
congestion because, “[i]f fewer parties appeal, there will be fewer 
                                                                                                                            
79 Id. 
80 Kunsch, supra note 1, at 20. Indeed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) itself 
recognizes this rationale in its text: “[T]he reviewing court must give due regard to the 
trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.” FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). 
81 Kunsch, supra note 1, at 20. Although the district court judge’s ability to observe the 
demeanor of witnesses is an important justification for deference under the clearly 
erroneous standard, Rule 52(a) nonetheless requires a reviewing court to review all of a 
district court’s factual findings with deference—even if those findings are based on 
documentary evidence rather than oral testimony. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of 
fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous . . . .” (emphasis added)). Despite this requirement, a court of appeals “may 
more easily find clear error when it has the same documents for decision as were available 
to the” district court. Casey et al., supra note 3, at 300. But “the Supreme Court has 
recognized that greater deference is due under the clearly erroneous standard to [the 
district court’s] findings . . . based upon the credibility of witnesses.” Id. (citing Anderson 
v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985); Bose Corp. v. Consumers 
Union, 466 U.S. 485, 500 (1984)). 
82 Kunsch, supra note 1, at 19. 
83 Id. 
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appellate cases.”84 Finally, deference to the district court’s factual 
decisions helps maintain the public’s confidence in district-court 
judges; if the courts of appeals’ reversal rates were greater due to a 
lack of deference to district courts’ findings, the public’s confi-
dence may be reduced.85 
Additionally, the assignment of the amount of deference that a 
court of appeals must give to a district court’s findings “balance[s] 
the power among the courts.”86 Indeed, “the fundamental notion 
behind a standard of review is that of defining the relationship and 
power shared among judicial bodies.”87 Standards of review that 
allow an appellate court to give less deference to a decision of a trial 
court necessarily give more power to the appellate court relative to 
the trial court than standards of review that are more deferential. 
Thus, the way in which the appellate court establishes how much 
deference to give the district court for various issues is related to 
the amount of power the court has. 
3. Substantial Evidence 
Whereas the Federal Circuit uses the clear-error standard to 
review a district-court judge’s factual findings, the court uses the 
substantial-evidence standard to review a jury’s factual findings.88 
The substantial-evidence standard is an even more deferential 
standard than clear error, “based on the policy judgment that 
bench trial findings are less sacrosanct on review than are jury ver-
dicts.”89 This result flows from the Seventh Amendment.90 In ad-
dition to providing the right to a jury trial in civil litigation, the Se-
venth Amendment also limits appellate review of a jury’s factual 
findings: “[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined 
in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
                                                                                                                            
84 Id. at 20. 
85 Id. 
86 Peters, supra note 1, at 238. 
87 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 1.01, at 1-3. 
88 Casey et al., supra note 3, at 307; see also, e.g., Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & 
Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
89 Casey et al., supra note 3, at 308. 
90 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
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common law.”91 Jury trials are very common in patent litigation 
today,92 and in a jury trial, the jury usually decides most of the im-
portant issues.93 
Under the substantial-evidence standard, a reviewing court 
must affirm a jury’s factual finding as long as it is supported by 
substantial evidence.94 The Supreme Court has defined “substan-
tial evidence” as follows: 
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, and 
must do more than create a suspicion of the exis-
tence of the fact to be established. “It means such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion,” and it must be 
enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal 
to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be 
drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.95 
4. Abuse of Discretion 
Abuse of discretion is the most deferential standard.96 A re-
viewing court uses this highly deferential standard for the review of 
issues where the district court “has a range of choices in deciding 
an issue.”97 Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, a reviewing 
court “will not disturb [the district court’s] choice as long as the 
choice is within the predetermined range, and is not influenced by 
any mistake of law or [sufficiently] erroneous findings of fact.”98 
                                                                                                                            
91 Id.; see also Casey et al., supra note 3, at 308 (“Appellate challenges to jury findings 
of fact rarely succeed, because the Seventh Amendment proscribes review of such 
findings even more than Rule 52 restricts review of trial court findings of fact.”). 
92 See Lemley, supra note 15, at 1674 (“The jury trial is a fixture of modern patent 
litigation.”). Professor Lemley determined that, of all the U.S. patent trials between 2000 
and June 2011, almost seventy-five percent of them were jury trials rather than bench 
trials. Id. at 1674 n.1 (citing Mark A. Lemley et al., Rush to Judgment? Trial Length and 
Outcomes in Patent Cases, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 169, 172, 174 (2013)). 
93 Id. at 1674. 
94 19 JAMES W. MOORE ET. AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE: CIVIL § 206.02 (3d ed. 
2016); Peters, supra note 1, at 245. 
95 NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 
96 Peters, supra note 1, at 243. 
97 Casey et al., supra note 3, at 310. 
98 Id. 
572          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:555 
 
The Federal Circuit specifically defines “abuse of discretion” as 
where a “decision was based on clearly erroneous findings of fact, 
an incorrect conclusion of law, or a clear error of judgment.”99 
The Federal Circuit applies the abuse-of-discretion standard to 
equitable determinations, such as injunctions, inequitable conduct, 
enhanced damages, and attorney fees.100 The court also applies the 
abuse-of-discretion standard to “discretionary matter[s] involving 
the admission of evidence, discovery, or other trial management 
issues.”101 Indeed, because this standard is so highly deferential, 
the Federal Circuit rarely reverses such decisions.102 
B. How Courts Decide Whether an Issue Is a Question of Law Versus 
a Question of Fact 
Courts admittedly have difficulty in deciding whether an issue 
is properly a question of law as opposed to a question of fact.103 But 
the resolution of this question is important because to determine 
what level of appellate deference, if any, is appropriate for a partic-
ular issue, a court must decide whether the issue should be consi-
                                                                                                                            
99 E.g., Whitserve, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 37 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(citing Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
100 Casey et al., supra note 3, at 310; see also Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. 
Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1749 (2014) (holding that the abuse of discretion standard 
applies to the Federal Circuit’s review of a decision as to whether a case is “exceptional” 
to support an award of attorney fees). 
101 Casey et al., supra note 3, at 310. Technically, for procedural—rather than 
substantive—issues such as these, the Federal Circuit applies the standard of review as 
indicated by the precedent of the court of appeals of the regional circuit from within 
which the district court was located, rather than applying its own determination as to 
which standard to apply. See Field, supra note 2, at 645 (citing Midwest Indus., Inc. v. 
Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc in relevant part)). 
But, for issues involving evidence, discovery, or trial management, the circuit courts of 
appeals uniformly apply the abuse of discretion standard. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra 
note 1, § 4.01, at 4-2. 
102 Casey et al., supra note 3, at 310. 
103 See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985) (“[T]he appropriate methodology for 
distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law has been, to say the least, 
elusive.”); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (“The Court has 
previously noted the vexing nature of the distinction between questions of fact and 
questions of law.” (citing Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944))); 
Nathan Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1922) (“The delusive 
simplicity of the distinction between questions of law and questions of fact has been found 
a will-of-the-wisp by travelers approaching it from several directions.”). 
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dered a question of law or a question of fact.104 Although some is-
sues are easy to classify as either questions of law or fact,105 other 
issues present greater difficulty.106 Indeed, it is often more realistic 
to think of a particular issue as lying on a continuum between law 
and fact rather than as purely law or purely fact.107 Although there 
is no set rule for determining where on the spectrum a particular 
issue falls between law and fact,108 the Supreme Court has estab-
lished, and commentators have proposed, guidelines for doing 
so.109 
Section I.B.1 begins by discussing questions of fact. Next, Sec-
tion I.B.2 discusses questions of law. Finally, Section I.B.3 dis-
cusses how many courts use a functional approach to determining 
questions of fact versus questions of law. 
                                                                                                                            
104 See, e.g., Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 844–52 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the Court must consider whether claim 
construction is a question of law or fact to determine whether Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a)(6) requires review of subsidiary facts under a clearly erroneous 
standard); CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 2.21, at 2-116 (“Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52 does not draw the lines demarking fact, protected by the rule on appeal, and 
legal or mixed law-fact questions, which are generally freely reviewed except where they 
are controlled by underlying facts.”); Casey et al., supra note 3, at 316 (“[T]he type of 
issue under view, law versus fact, helps to determine the standard of review.”); Steven 
Alan Childress, “Clearly Erroneous”: Judicial Review over District Courts in the Eighth 
Circuit and Beyond, 51 MO. L. REV. 93, 98 (1986) (“The law-fact distinction . . . is crucial 
because the clearly erroneous rule protects factfindings from summary reversal but does 
not apply to errors of law, reviewed de novo.”); Kunsch, supra note 1, at 27–28; Robert L. 
Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 
HARV. L. REV. 70, 93–95 (1944) (“More troublesome has been the problem as to just what 
questions are to be treated as fact or as law.”). 
105 Ray A. Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 HARV. L. REV. 899, 900 (1943) 
(“[E]ven the most obstinate realist could distinguish in kind between the question 
whether the Rule against Perpetuities may operate to render void a grantor’s power of 
termination for breach of condition subsequent, and the question whether it was Tom 
Jones or Bob Smith who drove the automobile that ran over Billy Brown.”). 
106 Casey et al., supra note 3, at 317 (“The distinction between law and fact for purposes 
of identifying standard of review is often a difficult line to draw.”). 
107 Id. at 318; accord Kunsch, supra note 1, at 21. 
108 Miller, 474 U.S. at 113; Casey et al., supra note 3, at 318; Kunsch, supra note 1, at 22. 
109 See, e.g., Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Miller, 474 U.S. at 112–18; 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 498–511 (1984); Pullman-Standard v. 
Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 285–90 (1982); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670–71 
(1944); Childress, supra note 104, at 131–37, 154–88; Kunsch, supra note 1, at 21–23; 
Stern, supra note 104, at 93–99. 
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1. Questions of Fact 
Some issues are clearly questions of fact.110 For example, an is-
sue involving the determination of a pure historical fact111 is un-
doubtedly a question of fact.112 Questions of fact also include issues 
of a more abstract nature, such as the state of mind of an individu-
al—even where that “state of mind may be of legal importance.”113 
And even though an inference is required to determine an issue, 
that issue may still be considered a question of fact.114 
Another type of fact is the “ultimate fact,” which is more diffi-
cult to classify as a question of law or fact than other types of facts. 
An “ultimate fact” is a fact that embodies the “ultimate issue for 
resolution.”115 Indeed, as one commentator has described: 
Ultimate facts present a different kind of “factual” 
inquiry, one involving a process that “implies the 
application of standards of law.” Like some histori-
cal facts, ultimate facts are derived by reasoning or 
inference from evidence, but, like issues of law, they 
incorporate legal principles or policies that give 
them independent legal significance. They often in-
volve the characterization of historical facts, and 
                                                                                                                            
110 Childress, supra note 104, at 132. 
111 “A historical fact is a thing done, an action performed, or an event or occurrence.” 
William W. Schwarzer et al., The Analysis and Decision of Summary Judgment Motions, 139 
F.R.D. 441, 455 (1992). 
112 See Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In general, [the Supreme 
Court has] treated district court determinations as ‘analytically more akin to a fact’ the 
more they pertain to a simple historical fact of the case . . . .”); Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed 
Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 112 (1924) (“The primary and popular 
meaning of the word ‘fact’ is something which has happened or existed . . . .”); Brown, 
supra note 105, at 902 (“Questions of fact involve inquiries . . . as to the existence of acts 
and states of being in the concrete physical universe . . . .”); Casey et al., supra note 3, at 
317 (“Generally, facts are those findings that respond to inquiries about who, when, what, 
and where.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Childress, supra note 104, at 132 
(“[W]hat Alice did yesterday is a ‘pure fact’ . . . .”); Kunsch, supra note 1, at 22 (“Where 
courts perceive the inquiry as empirical—revolving around actual events, past or future—
the inquiry is labeled a question of fact . . . .”); Stern, supra note 104, at 93 (“Obviously 
an issue as to whether a particular act occurred . . . is factual.”). 
113 Bohlen, supra note 112, at 112; accord Miller, 474 U.S. at 113; Pullman-Standard, 456 
U.S. at 288; Brown, supra note 105, at 902; Stern, supra note 104, at 93. 
114 Childress, supra note 104, at 132. 
115 Id. at 142. 
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their resolution is generally outcome-
determinative.116 
Particular ultimate facts may be closer to questions of fact or 
questions of law.117 
Importantly, just because an issue may be classified as one in-
volving an ultimate fact does not necessarily convert that issue into 
a question of law.118 In the past, many courts automatically treated 
ultimate facts as questions of law to be reviewed de novo.119 But the 
Supreme Court has effectively killed this rule.120 In Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, the Court noted: 
Rule 52(a) broadly requires that findings of fact not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous. It does not 
make exceptions or purport to exclude certain cate-
gories of factual findings from the obligation of a 
court of appeals to accept a district court’s findings 
unless clearly erroneous. It does not divide facts into 
categories; in particular it does not divide findings of 
fact into those that deal with “ultimate” and those that 
deal with “subsidiary” facts.121 
Thus, the doctrine that an ultimate fact is automatically a ques-
tion of law “is no longer viable—at least where it allows de novo 
review ‘whenever the result in a case turns on a factual find-
ing.’”122 
                                                                                                                            
116 Schwarzer et al., supra note 111, at 456–57 (footnote omitted) (citing Baumgartner v. 
United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944)). 
117 Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of 
Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 89 (1997) (“Ultimate facts can be 
more ‘factual’ (e.g., whether a driver recklessly or negligently operated an automobile), 
or more ‘legal’ (e.g., whether a defamation plaintiff is a public figure for First 
Amendment purposes).” (citing Schwarzer et al., supra note 111, at 457)). 
118 See Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 287; Childress, supra note 104, at 142. 
119 Childress, supra note 104, at 141–42. 
120 Id. at 142. 
121 456 U.S. at 287 (emphasis added). 
122 Childress, supra note 104, at 142 (quoting Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 286 n.16). 
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2. Questions of Law 
Similarly, some issues are clearly questions of law.123 Such ob-
vious questions of law “are fact-free general principles that are ap-
plicable to all, or at least to many, disputes and not simply to the 
one sub judice.”124 Thus, a general definition of a question of law 
“is a statement of a general principle or rule, made in advance of a 
case, awaiting application to particular facts that may arise.”125 
Clear questions of law include interpretations of the Constitution126 
and statutes.127 Questions of law also usually include interpreta-
                                                                                                                            
123 Id. at 132. 
124 Casey et al., supra note 3, at 317 (quoting Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative 
Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the 
Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 
993 n.3 (1986)). 
125 Id.; see also Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 845 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In general, we have treated district-court determinations . . . as 
‘analytically more akin to . . . a legal conclusion’ the more they define rules applicable 
beyond the parties’ dispute.” (second omission in original)); Bohlen, supra note 112, at 
112 (“‘Law’ primarily means a body of principles and rules which are capable of being 
predicated in advance and which are so predicated, awaiting proof of the facts necessary 
for their application.”); Brown, supra note 105, at 904 (“‘Law’ in its best accepted sense 
refers to precepts generally and uniformly applicable to all persons of like qualities and 
status and in like circumstances.”); Stern, supra note 104, at 94 (“When the issue relates 
to the existence or nature of a general rule or standard which will be applicable to many 
cases, it is normally regarded as presenting a question of law.”).  
In 1922, one commentator helpfully likened the distinction between questions of law 
and fact to major and minor premises in a syllogism. See Isaacs, supra note 103, at 2. He 
reasoned: 
I refer to the legal reasoning in which propositions of law are 
contrasted with propositions of fact very much as major premises are 
contrasted with minor premises, and, in which conclusions are drawn 
by the very same process. Theoretically, the court knows all of those 
major premises which constitute the law. The jury is asked to tell the 
truth with reference to the minor premise, the fact of a particular 
case. Then the conclusion is supposed to take care of itself. 
Id. 
126 See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 2.13, at 2-72. In addition to treating 
constitutional interpretation as a question of law, the Supreme Court also treats fact-
finding in constitutional cases under the “law” umbrella. See id. § 2.19, at 2-108 (citing 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984)). Thus, the Court reviews such 
constitutional-fact issues under the de novo standard. Id. 
127 See, e.g., Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 369 (1995); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc., 557 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
2017] OBVIOUSNESS AS FACT 577 
 
tions of written documents, such as contracts and deeds.128 Thus, 
the Supreme Court treats claim construction129 as a question of law 
(though sometimes with factual underpinnings),130 likening inter-
pretation of patent claim terms to interpreting written documents 
in general.131 In addition to claim construction, the Federal Circuit 
treats a variety of other patent issues as questions of law132—
including, of course, invalidity due to obviousness.133 
3. A Functional Approach to Determining Questions of Fact 
Versus Law 
Rather than attempting to formally determine whether a par-
ticular thorny issue is more like a question of fact or law to deter-
mine how much deference to give a lower court’s findings, many 
appellate courts take a more functional approach.134 For so-called 
“mixed questions of fact and law,” these courts rely on policy con-
siderations, such as whether “one judicial actor is better positioned 
                                                                                                                            
128 See Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 837 (“Construction of written instruments often presents a 
‘question solely of law’ . . . .” (quoting Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchs.’ Elevator Co., 259 
U.S. 285, 291 (1922)). 
129 For a very brief discussion of claim construction, see supra note 17. For a more 
detailed discussion of claim construction, see generally Teva, 135 S. Ct. 831; Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); MUELLER, supra note 17, at 447–65. 
130 Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 838. 
131 Markman, 517 U.S. at 388–89; see Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
132 See, e.g., Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 684 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (invalidity for lack of enablement under 35 U.S.C § 112, ¶ 1); Eidos Display, 
LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 779 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (invalidity for 
indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2); EMD Millipore Corp. v. AllPure Techs., Inc., 
768 F.3d 1196, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (application of prosecution history estoppel to 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 633 
F.3d 1042, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101); 
Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (double 
patenting), amended on reh’g, 204 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Daniels, 144 F.3d 
1452, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (entitlement to priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120); Panduit Corp. 
v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (whether a reference qualifies 
as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102). 
133 Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1566. 
134 See Childress, supra note 104, at 133 (describing the use of a “functional approach” 
that “focuses on review policy, competency, and uncertainty rather than on some analytic 
meaning ‘inside’ the words ‘fact’ and ‘law’”); cf. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113–14 
(1985) (describing the determination of law versus fact as “as much a matter of allocation 
as it is of analysis”). 
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than another to decide the issue in question.”135 Under this ap-
proach, if an appellate court believes that an issue is better decided 
by a judge, then the court treats the issue as a question of law.136 
But if the appellate court believes that the issue is better decided by 
a jury, then the court treats the issue as a question of fact.137 The 
Federal Circuit took such a functional approach in Panduit Corp. v. 
Dennison Manufacturing Co.,138 in which the court determined that 
obviousness is a question of law based on factual underpinnings.139 
Some commentators have criticized this functional approach.140 
They contend that by adopting such an approach, a reviewing court 
can improperly pick and choose whichever issues it wishes to re-
                                                                                                                            
135 Miller, 474 U.S. at 114; see Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (“The ‘magic’ of de novo appellate determination . . . serves not to reflect a nuanced 
definition of law and fact, but to affect trial/appellate authority and . . . the role of the 
jury.”); Childress, supra note 104, at 133; Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 50(a): Rationing 
and Rationalizing the Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 660 
(1988) (“Characterization of an issue of law application as fact or law for purposes of 
identifying a formalized standard of review depends on the perceived need for review, not 
on the actual status of the issue.”); Isaacs, supra note 103, at 7 (“Historically the 
distinction between law and facts that our courts have made has been based on 
procedure.”); Kunsch, supra note 1, at 23 (“When an issue falls within the blurred area of 
a mixed question, it might be better to fall back on policy considerations.”). 
136 Childress, supra note 104, at 133. 
137 United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 431 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J.) 
(“[W]hat a court can determine better than a jury, [is] perhaps about the only satisfactory 
criterion for distinguishing ‘law’ from ‘fact.’” (citing Loper v. Morrison, 145 P.2d 1, 6–7 
(Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., dissenting))); Loper, 145 P.2d at 6 (Traynor, J., dissenting) (“As 
a general rule, . . . the court determines the law and the jury the facts, unless it appears 
that the issue is one that the jury can determine better than the court.”); Childress, supra 
note 104, at 133 (citing J.B. Williams, 498 F.2d at 431); cf. Casey et al., supra note 3, at 316 
(“Implicit in selecting a standard of review is a crucial policy decision: Whether the trial 
court . . . or the appellate court . . . is better suited to decide a particular issue in a case.”). 
138 Panduit, 810 F.2d 1561. 
139 Id. at 1566. 
140 See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 3.09, at 3-71; R. Jack Ayres, Jr., Judicial 
Nullification of the Right to Trial by Jury by “Evolving” Standards of Appellate Review, 60 
BAYLOR L. REV. 337, 477–79 (2008); Brown, supra note 105, at 900. But see Bose Corp. v. 
Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 501 n.17 (1984) (“Regarding certain largely factual 
questions in some areas of the law, the stakes—in terms of impact on future cases and 
future conduct—are too great to entrust them finally to the judgment of the trier of 
fact.”). 
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view de novo.141 And the functional approach allows a court to easi-
ly but improperly “renam[e] or recharacteriz[e] traditional fact is-
sues . . . as questions of law . . . .”142 Indeed, some commentators 
have pointed out that courts can use functional determination that 
a particular issue is a question of law as “an artifice to justify” de 
novo review of what really should be a factual question reviewed 
with deference.143 
Moreover, another reason that the functional approach may be 
flawed is because the issue of whether to allocate the determination 
of a particular question to the trial judge or the jury is properly a 
separate issue from whether to treat that question as a question of 
law or fact.144 Indeed, the Supreme Court recently treated the allo-
cation issue and the law-versus-fact issue as two separate concerns 
in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., where the Court 
decided that a judge’s factual findings with respect to the construc-
tion of patent claim terms is a question of fact to be reviewed for 
clear error.145 The Court had previously held in Markman v. West-
view Instruments, Inc. that the issue of claim construction must be 
allocated entirely to the court, not the jury.146 And the Court in 
Markman made this allocation despite characterizing claim con-
struction as “a mongrel practice” of law and fact.147 
In Teva, the Court expressly distinguished the allocation issue 
from the law-versus-fact issue: 
                                                                                                                            
141 See Brown, supra note 105, at 900 (“[W]e rather suspect that this seemingly rigid 
dichotomy of law and fact is only a bit of legalistic mummery designed to conceal from the 
uninitiated the fact that the courts decide these questions about as they wish.”). 
142 Ayres, supra note 140, at 478. 
143 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 3.09, at 3-71. 
144 See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837–38 (2015) 
(distinguishing the Seventh Amendment issue of whether to allocate claim construction 
to the court or jury from the issue of what standard of review to apply); Cybor Corp. v. 
FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1464–65 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Mayer, C.J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“[A]ll that Markman stands for is that the judge will do the 
resolving, not the jury. Wisely, the Supreme Court stopped short of authorizing us to find 
facts de novo when evidentiary disputes exist as part of the construction of a patent 
claim . . . .” (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996))). 
145 135 S. Ct. at 835. 
146 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 
147 Id. at 378. 
580          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:555 
 
Our opinion in Markman neither created, nor ar-
gued for, an exception to Rule 52(a). The question 
presented in that case was a Seventh Amendment 
question: Should a jury or a judge construe patent 
claims? . . .  
When describing claim construction we concluded 
that it was proper to treat the ultimate question of 
the proper construction of the patent as a question 
of law in the way that we treat document construc-
tion as a question of law. But this does not imply an 
exception to Rule 52(a) for underlying factual dis-
putes . . . . 
Accordingly, when we held in Markman that the ul-
timate question of claim construction is for the 
judge and not the jury, we did not create an excep-
tion from the ordinary rule governing appellate re-
view of factual matters . . . . A conclusion that an is-
sue is for the judge does not indicate that Rule 52(a) 
is inapplicable.148 
Thus, an appellate court can properly determine whether to al-
locate an issue to the judge versus the jury and separately decide 
whether the question is truly of law or fact regardless of the result 
of the allocation decision. Therefore, which standard of review to 
apply to a question should not depend upon whether the question 
is allocated to the judge or jury. 
II. INVALIDITY OF PATENT CLAIMS BASED UPON THE PRIOR 
ART 
In a patent-infringement suit, an accused infringer can raise the 
affirmative defense of invalidity.149 In bringing an invalidity de-
fense, the accused infringer asserts that one or more of the asserted 
patent claims are invalid for failure to satisfy any of the patentabili-
ty requirements.150 Two of these requirements are based on the 
                                                                                                                            
148 Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 837–38 (citations omitted). 
149 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)–(3) (2012). 
150 MUELLER, supra note 17, at 582. 
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prior art:151 novelty152 and nonobviousness.153 This Part provides an 
overview of these two requirements. Section I.A discusses anticipa-
tion—i.e., failure to meet the novelty requirement of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102. Section I.B examines obviousness—i.e., failure to meet the 
nonobviousness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 103. And Section I.C 
considers the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in categorizing the ulti-
mate issue of obviousness as a question of law to be reviewed de 
novo. 
A. Anticipation 
A patent claim is invalid for anticipation where it fails to satisfy 
the novelty requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 102.154 In other words, a 
claimed invention must be new.155 And if an accused infringer suc-
cessfully argues that the invention was not new, then the claimed 
invention is invalid for anticipation.156 Anticipation requires “strict 
identity” between a single prior reference and the claimed inven-
tion,157 which means that a prior-art reference anticipates a claim 
only where that reference alone discloses each and every limitation 
of the claim.158 In an infringement litigation where an accused in-
fringer brings a defense of invalidity for anticipation, a presumption 
exists that an issued patent claim is valid.159 Therefore, an accused 
infringer must prove that a claim is invalid by clear and convincing 
evidence.160 
A typical example of anticipation occurred in Krippelz v. Ford 
Motor Co.,161 a case about a patent covering a type of emergency 
                                                                                                                            
151 “Prior art” is a “[g]eneral term for the categories of prior technology or events 
against which the patentability of a claimed invention is evaluated.” Id. at 708. “What 
qualifies as prior art . . . for purposes of novelty is cataloged by the various subcategories 
of 35 U.S.C. § 102.” Id. 
152 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
153 See id. § 103. 
154 1-3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 3.01 (2016). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 MUELLER, supra note 17, at 697 (defining “anticipation”). 
158 See, e.g., Krippelz v. Ford Motor Co., 667 F.3d 1261, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
159 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). 
160 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011); see also, e.g., Krippelz, 667 
F.3d at 1265. 
161 Krippelz, 667 F.3d 1261. 
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light used in automobiles.162 At issue was the second claim, which 
read in relevant part: 
An emergency warning light for an automotive ve-
hicle having a window on side thereof, comprising in 
combination a housing mounted in a fixed, substan-
tially unadjustable position on said vehicle adjacent 
to said window, . . . a source of light mounted within 
said housing for directing a conical beam of light 
downwardly through said opening . . . .163 
The accused infringer argued that the claim was invalid for an-
ticipation because a French patent from 1953 disclosed all the claim 
limitations.164 But a jury found that the claim was not invalid for 
anticipation, and the district court denied the accused infringer’s 
motion for a judgment as a matter of law.165 The district court rea-
soned that a reasonable jury could find that the French patent 
failed to disclose the “conical beam of light” and “adjacent to the 
[sic] window” limitations.166 On appeal, the Federal Circuit re-
versed on this issue.167 The Federal Circuit noted that the French 
patent did indeed disclose both these limitations.168 Although “the 
district court cited several varieties of evidence to overcome these 
disclosures in [the French patent],” the Federal Circuit held that 
this evidence “was legally insufficient to support a” finding of no 
anticipation.169 Thus, the Federal Circuit held that the claim at is-
sue was invalid for anticipation because a single prior-art reference 
disclosed all limitations of the claim as a matter of law.170 
                                                                                                                            
162 Id. at 1263. 
163 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,017,903 col. 3 l. 19 to col. 4 l. 3 
(filed Feb. 21, 1989)). 
164 Id. at 1264. 
165 Id. at 1264–65. 
166 Id. at 1265. 
167 Id. at 1270. 
168 Id. at 1267, 1269. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
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As the Krippelz case illustrates, anticipation is a highly technical 
issue.171 As such, anticipation is essentially a question of historical 
fact—whether the prior-art reference in question discloses each 
and every limitation of the claim at issue.172 Therefore, the Federal 
Circuit properly treats anticipation as a question of fact,173 re-
viewed under either the clearly erroneous174 or substantial-
evidence175 standard, as appropriate. 
B. Obviousness 
A patent claim is invalid for obviousness where it fails to satisfy 
the nonobviousness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 103,176 which pro-
vides: 
A patent for a claimed invention may not be ob-
tained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention 
is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 
102, if the differences between the claimed inven-
tion and the prior art are such that the claimed in-
vention as a whole would have been obvious before 
the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which the 
claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be 
negated by the manner in which the invention was 
made.177 
                                                                                                                            
171 See Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 708 F.2d 151, 154 (5th Cir. 
1983) (“The defense of anticipation, derived principally from § 102(a), is strictly 
technical, requiring a showing of actual identity in the prior art.” (footnote omitted)). 
172 Krippelz, 667 F.3d at 1265. 
173 Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 726 F.3d 1306, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
174 Id. 
175 Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
176 See generally KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); Graham v. John 
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); 2-5 CHISUM, supra note 154, § 5.01. 
177 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). The quoted text of § 103 is that which is currently in force as 
of the enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”). The previous 
version of § 103 remains in effect for patent applications filed before the AIA took effect. 
2-5 CHISUM, supra note 154, § 5.01. These provisions are almost identical except that the 
relevant time frame for the old version is “at the time the invention was made,” whereas 
in the AIA version, the time frame is “before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention.” Compare 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012), with 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). Additional 
stylistic differences also exist, but these differences do not affect the meaning of the 
statute. 
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Unlike anticipation, a claim may be invalid for obviousness 
even if no single prior-art reference discloses the claimed inven-
tion.178 
Importantly, whether a claim is invalid for obviousness is an ob-
jective inquiry.179 The inquiry is not whether a claimed invention is 
subjectively obvious to the inventor or a particular judge, jury, or 
expert witness;180 instead, the question is whether the claimed in-
vention would have been obvious to a hypothetical “person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains” 
(“PHOSITA”).181 This hypothetical PHOSITA is analogous to the 
reasonably prudent person used in applying the objective standard 
for duty of care in negligence law.182 
In 1966, in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, the Su-
preme Court provided the framework for determining the question 
of obviousness under § 103.183 And in the 2007 case KSR Interna-
tional Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court reaffirmed that courts 
today must continue to use this framework in analyzing obvious-
ness.184 Using the Graham framework, a court must proceed as fol-
lows: 
Under § 103, [1] the scope and content of the prior 
art are to be determined; [2] differences between 
the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascer-
tained; and [3] the level of ordinary skill in the per-
tinent art resolved. Against this background, the ob-
                                                                                                                            
178 2-5 CHISUM, supra note 154, § 5.01. 
179 KSR, 550 U.S. at 406. 
180 Life Techs., Inc. v. Clontech Lab., Inc., 224 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(“Because patentability is assessed from the perspective of the hypothetical person of 
ordinary skill in the art, information regarding the subjective motivations of inventors is 
not material.”); 2-5 CHISUM, supra note 154, § 5.04 (“We do not measure the knowledge 
of any particular person, or any particular expert who might testify in the case, but, rather, 
we measure the knowledge of a hypothetical person skilled in the art, who has thought 
about the subject matter of the patented invention in the light of that art.” (quoting Flour 
City Architectural Metals v. Alpana Aluminum Prods., Inc., 454 F.2d 98, 107–08 (8th 
Cir. 1972))). 
181 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); see 2-5 CHISUM, supra note 154, § 5.04. 
182 2-5 CHISUM, supra note 154, § 5.04 (citing Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 911 
(6th Cir. 1978)). 
183 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
184 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (citing Graham, 383 U.S. at 15–18). 
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viousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is 
determined. Such secondary considerations as 
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, 
failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light 
to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the 
subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of 
obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may 
have relevancy.185 
Although the Court in Graham characterized “the ultimate 
question of [obviousness] as one of law,”186 the Court recognized 
that this framework involves “factual inquiries.”187 
Indeed, the question that arose in KSR presents a good exam-
ple of how a court analyzes the issue of obviousness.188 The claim 
at issue in KSR covered “a mechanism for combining an electronic 
sensor with an adjustable automobile pedal so the pedal’s position 
can be transmitted to a computer that controls the throttle in the 
vehicle’s engine.”189 This invention allowed drivers to adjust the 
position of the accelerator pedal to accommodate drivers of differ-
ent heights, while at the same time including an electronic—rather 
than mechanical—sensor for determining the position of the pedal 
and sending the appropriate signals to a computer-controlled throt-
tle.190 The claim at issue covered “a position-adjustable pedal as-
sembly with an electronic pedal position sensor attached to the 
support member of the pedal assembly” in a fixed position.191 
The Court applied the Graham framework and held that the 
scope and content of the prior art included a patent issued to Asa-
no, which disclosed an adjustable pedal with a fixed pivot point (al-
beit with a mechanical—rather than electronic—position sensor), 
and a patent issued to Smith, which disclosed a pedal with an elec-
                                                                                                                            
185 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. 
186 Id. at 17. 
187 Id. 
188 KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. 398. 
189 Id. at 405. 
190 Id. at 408–09. 
191 Id. at 411 (quoting Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 586–87 (E.D. 
Mich. 2003), vacated, 119 F. App’x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 398 (2007)). 
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tronic sensor mounted in a fixed position on the pedal assembly.192 
The Court then concluded that there was “little difference be-
tween the teachings of Asano and Smith and the adjustable elec-
tronic pedal disclosed in” the claim at issue.193 Indeed, the Court 
noted that the district court “found that combining Asano with a 
pivot-mounted pedal position sensor fell within the scope of” the 
claim at issue.194 Additionally, the Court agreed with the district 
court’s finding that the level of ordinary skill in the art was “an un-
dergraduate degree in mechanical engineering (or an equivalent 
amount of industry experience) [and] familiarity with pedal control 
systems for vehicles.”195 From these facts, the Court concluded 
that the district court correctly held that it would have been “ob-
vious to a person of ordinary skill to combine Asano with a pivot-
mounted pedal position sensor.”196 Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that the claim at issue was invalid for obviousness.197 
C. The Federal Circuit Classifies the Issue of Obviousness as a 
Question of Law Based on Underlying Facts 
The Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated that the ultimate is-
sue of invalidity for obviousness is a question of law based on un-
derlying factual determinations.198 Thus, the Federal Circuit re-
views the ultimate question of obviousness de novo.199 But the 
court reviews the underlying factual determinations for substantial 
evidence in a jury trial200 and clear error in a bench trial.201 
                                                                                                                            
192 Id. at 408–09. The Court noted that the district court had found that the scope and 
content of the prior art also included other references that disclosed similar adjustable 
pedals and pedals using electronic sensors in fixed positions. Id. 
193 Id. at 422. 
194 Id. at 423. 
195 Id. at 412–13 (alteration in original) (quoting Teleflex, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 590). 
196 Id. at 424. The Court noted that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have 
seen the benefits” of combining Asano and Smith to achieve the invention of the claim at 
issue. Id. at 422. 
197 Id. at 427. 
198 See, e.g., Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg Inc., 705 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2013), amended by 728 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 
810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
199 See Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1565–66. 
200 See Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark Pharm. Inc., USA, 748 F.3d 
1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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The Federal Circuit confronted the issue of whether the ulti-
mate question of obviousness is one of law or fact in 1987 in Pan-
duit Corp. v. Dennison Manufacturing Co.202 In Panduit, after a 
bench trial, the district court issued a judgment that the relevant 
patent claims were invalid for obviousness.203 On appeal, the Fed-
eral Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and held that the 
claims were not invalid.204 The Supreme Court then granted the 
accused infringer’s petition for a writ of certiorari205 based on the 
argument that “the Federal Circuit ignored Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a) in substituting its view of factual issues for that of 
the [d]istrict [c]ourt.”206 The Court criticized the Federal Circuit 
for failing to even “mention Rule 52(a),” failing to “explicitly ap-
ply the clearly-erroneous standard to any of the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s 
findings on obviousness,” and failing to “explain why, if it was of 
that view, Rule 52(a) had no applicability to this issue.”207 The 
Court noted that it “lacked the benefit of the Federal Circuit’s in-
formed opinion on the complex issue of the degree to which the 
obviousness determination is one of fact.”208 Thus, the Court va-
cated the Federal Circuit’s original opinion and remanded the case 
to the Federal Circuit “for further consideration in light of Rule 
52(a).”209 
On remand, the Federal Circuit again reversed the district 
court’s holding that the relevant claims were invalid for obvious-
ness.210 In an opinion written by Chief Judge Markey,211 the court 
                                                                                                                            
201 See Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing 
Winner Int’l Realty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
202 810 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
203 Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1985), vacated, 
475 U.S. 809 (1986). 
204 Id. 
205 Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986) (per curiam). 
206 Id. at 810. Rule 52(a) provides that courts of appeal must give deference to the fact 
findings of district courts: “Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, 
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due 
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
52(a)(6). 
207 Panduit, 475 U.S. at 811. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
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analyzed in detail whether the obviousness determination under 
§ 103 is one of fact or law.212 The court began by noting that this 
determination involves issues of both fact and law.213 The court 
gave examples of the types of facts that may be involved in the 
analysis: 
[1] what a prior art patent as a whole discloses; [2] 
what it in fact disclosed to workers in the art; [3] 
what differences exist between the entire prior art, 
or a whole prior art structure, and the whole 
claimed invention; [4] what the differences enabled 
the claimed subject matter as a whole to achieve; [5] 
that others for years sought and failed to arrive at 
the claimed invention; [6] that one of those others 
copied it; [7] that the invention met on its merits 
with outstanding commercial success.214 
The court held that it must defer to the findings of the district 
court concerning these facts, reversing such findings only if they 
are clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a).215 
                                                                                                                            
211 The late Chief Judge Howard T. Markey was a well-respected leader in patent law. 
See generally Paul R. Michel, A Memoir of the First Chief Judge by the Fifth Chief Judge, 6 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 310 (2007); Antonin Scalia, The Legacy of Judge Howard 
T. Markey, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1 (2009). After a 
distinguished career as a patent practitioner and then a judge on the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals, he was selected to be the first chief judge of the Federal Circuit. 
Michel, supra, at 310. He was an “extremely active jurist, sitting in over 5,000 cases on 
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Federal Circuit and sitting as a visiting 
judge in over 1,400 cases, both civil and criminal, in every one of the Regional Circuit 
Courts.” Scalia, supra, at 1 (footnotes omitted). And “[h]e authored over 1,000 opinions, 
numerous articles on the law and delivered countless speeches and lectures.” Id. 
(footnotes omitted). 
212 See Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1566–68. 
213 Id. at 1566. 
214 Id. These facts are a detailed description of those that the Supreme Court outlined in 
Graham v. John Deere. For a brief discussion of these so-called Graham factors, see supra 
text accompanying notes 183–87. 
215 See Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1569. The court stated: 
Rule 52(a) is applicable to all findings on the four inquiries listed in 
Graham: scope and content of prior art; differences between prior art 
and claimed invention; level of skill; and objective evidence 
(secondary considerations). The last may include: commercial 
success due to the invention; failure of others; long felt need; 
movement of the skilled in a different direction; skepticism of 
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But as far as the ultimate conclusion of obviousness or nonob-
viousness, the Federal Circuit held that this question is one of 
law.216 The question to be answered in this analysis is whether the 
claimed invention would have been obvious to a hypothetical 
PHOSITA.217 Likening this hypothetical PHOSITA to the reason-
ably prudent person used in negligence law,218 the court reasoned 
that this question is one of law: 
To reach a proper conclusion under § 103, the [de-
cision maker] must step backward in time and into 
the shoes worn by that “person” when the inven-
tion was unknown and just before it was made. In 
light of all the evidence, the [decision maker] must 
then determine whether the patent challenger has 
convincingly established that the claimed invention 
as a whole would have been obvious at that time to 
that person.219 
The court concluded that “[t]he answer to that question par-
takes more of the nature of law than of fact, for it is an ultimate 
conclusion based on a foundation formed of all the probative 
facts.”220 
The Federal Circuit took a functional approach in determining 
whether the ultimate question of obviousness should be a question 
of law or fact.221 The court analyzed such “functional factors, in-
cluding the decisional process, a literal impression in which the in-
quiry ‘partakes’ more of law, drawn from facts, and precedent, cit-
                                                                                                                            
experts; copying the invention in preference to the prior art; and 
other events proved to have actually happened in the real world 
(hence the description “objective”). 
Id. (citations omitted). 
216 Id. at 1566–67. 
217 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14 (1966) 
(“Patentability is to depend . . . upon the non-obvious nature of the subject matter sought 
to be patented to a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
218 See Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1566 (“With the involved facts determined, the [decision 
maker] confronts a ghost, i.e., ‘a person having ordinary skill in the art,’ not unlike the 
‘reasonable man’ and other ghosts in the law.”). 
219 Id. (citations and footnote omitted). 
220 Id. 
221 Casey et al., supra note 3, at 320. 
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ing the circuits and scholars and analyzing previous Supreme Court 
dicta.”222 Importantly, the court reasoned that treating the ob-
viousness inquiry as a question of law would “facilitate a consistent 
application of that statute in the courts and in the Patent and 
Trademark Office [‘PTO’].”223 The court ultimately held that the 
issue of obviousness is a question of law subject to factual under-
pinnings.224 
III. THE ULTIMATE QUESTION OF OBVIOUSNESS 
SHOULD PROPERLY BE A QUESTION OF FACT AND 
REVIEWED BY THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT WITH DEFERENCE 
The Federal Circuit was incorrect in Panduit225 in holding that 
the ultimate issue of obviousness should be treated as a question of 
law. Instead, this issue should be treated as a question of fact. This 
Part considers the reasons why. Section I.A begins by analyzing 
why the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Panduit was flawed. Next, 
Section I.B discusses how the Supreme Court’s statement in Gra-
ham that the ultimate question of obviousness is one of law is not 
properly supported by precedent. Section I.C considers how treat-
ing obviousness as a question of law is inconsistent with how the 
Federal Circuit treats anticipation and infringement. Finally, Sec-
tion I.D concludes that even though obviousness is supposed to be 
a question of law, district courts nonetheless treat the issue as a de 
facto question of fact. 
A. The Federal Circuit’s Reasoning in Panduit that the Ultimate 
Question of Obviousness Is a Question of Law Is Flawed 
The Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Panduit226 that the ultimate 
question of obviousness is a question of law is flawed.227 The 
                                                                                                                            
222 Id. 
223 Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1567; Casey et al., supra note 3, at 320 (quoting Panduit, 810 
F.2d at 1567). 
224 Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1566; Casey et al., supra note 3, at 320 (citing Panduit, 810 F.2d 
at 1566). 
225 Panduit, 810 F.2d 1561. 
226 Id. at 1566–67. 
227 For a discussion of the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in the Panduit case, see supra 
Section I.C. In addition to holding that the ultimate question of obviousness is a question 
of law, the Federal Circuit in Panduit confirmed that the obviousness determination is 
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court’s first instance of faulty reasoning is in holding that the ob-
viousness “determination engages [the] court in an exercise legal 
in nature.”228 But the obviousness determination is not legal in na-
ture. To be “legal in nature”229 under the traditional definition, the 
issue should involve “fact-free general principles that are applica-
ble to all, or at least to many, disputes and not simply to the one sub 
judice.”230 And such a “legal” issue should be “a statement of a 
general principle or rule, made in advance of a case, awaiting appli-
cation to particular facts that may arise.”231 But the question of ob-
viousness does not meet either of these definitions. Instead, the 
question of whether a particular claim in a particular patent is 
invalid for obviousness affects only that claim and that patent.232 
The determination does not have application beyond the case sub 
judice. It is simply not “an exercise legal in nature.”233 
Moreover, the fact that a determination of invalidity has prec-
lusive effect does not turn obviousness into a question of law. The 
Supreme Court held in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univer-
sity of Illinois Foundation that whenever a court declares a patent 
claim to be invalid in an infringement action, that claim is dead to 
the whole world and cannot be reasserted by the patentee against a 
different party in a different action.234 This principle of non-mutual 
collateral estoppel applies regardless of the grounds for validity—
                                                                                                                            
based on factual underpinnings, which are to be reviewed with deference. Panduit, 810 
F.2d at 1568–69. This Article does not question this holding, which is plainly correct in 
the author’s opinion. 
228 Id. at 1566. 
229 Id. 
230 Casey et al., supra note 3, at 317 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Louis, 
supra note 124, at 993 n.3). 
231 Id.; see also Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 845 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Bohlen, supra note 112, at 112; Brown, supra note 105, at 904; 
Stern, supra note 104, at 94. 
232 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (“Each claim of a patent . . . shall be presumed valid 
independently of the validity of other claims . . . .”). 
233 Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1566. 
234 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971); see also MUELLER, supra note 17, at 581 (“[O]nce a U.S. 
patent has been declared invalid, it is dead and cannot be resuscitated.”). This result 
follows from the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel, and thus it requires that the 
patentee “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate” the invalidity issue in question. 
Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329. 
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whether obviousness, anticipation, or anything else.235 Thus, an 
argument exists that an obviousness determination is legal in na-
ture because it is “applicable to . . . many[] disputes and not simply 
to the one sub judice.”236 But many of the grounds for invalidity 
other than obviousness—such as anticipation—are questions of 
fact.237 If the application of the Blonder-Tongue collateral-estoppel 
rule could make obviousness a question of law, then it logically 
would have to convert all these other grounds for invalidity into 
questions of law as well.238 But that result makes no sense. These 
other grounds for invalidity are questions of fact because they are 
factual in nature. So the Blonder-Tongue rule cannot properly be the 
reason that obviousness is considered a question of law. 
Another example of faulty reasoning in Panduit was when the 
Federal Circuit likened the PHOSITA239 to the reasonably prudent 
person used in negligence law.240 The court reasoned that because 
the obviousness determination is objective and relies on the 
PHOSITA, whether a claimed invention would have been obvious 
to a PHOSITA is “more of the nature of law than of fact, for it is 
an ultimate conclusion based on a foundation formed of all the 
                                                                                                                            
235 See Miss. Chem. Corp. v. Swift Agric. Chems. Corp., 717 F.2d 1374, 1378–79 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983). 
236 Casey et al., supra note 3, at 317 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Louis, 
supra note 124, at 993 n.3). 
237 See Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 682 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (“Whether a patent claim is supported by an adequate written description is a 
question of fact.” (quoting AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co., KG v. Janssen Biotech, 
Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2014))); Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 
726 F.3d 1306, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Anticipation is a question of fact, and a district 
court’s finding on this issue is reviewed for clear error.”); PHG Techs., LLC v. St. John 
Cos., 469 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Whether a patented design is functional or 
ornamental is a question of fact.”); Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“This court reviews a finding of derivation as a question of fact.”); 
Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(“Utility is a factual issue, which we review for clear error.”). 
238 Indeed, such a rule would logically have to convert any issue that might have a 
preclusive effect under collateral estoppel into a question of law. 
239 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
240 See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(“With the involved facts determined, the [decision maker] confronts a ghost, i.e., ‘a 
person having ordinary skill in the art,’ not unlike the ‘reasonable man’ and other ghosts 
in the law.”). 
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probative facts.”241 This reason is faulty for at least two reasons: (1) 
negligence is a question of fact, not a question of law; and (2) just 
because obviousness—like negligence—is an “ultimate fact,” does 
not mean that courts must treat obviousness as a question of law. 
First, negligence is not a question of law—courts generally 
treat negligence as a question of fact.242 Thus, if the Federal Circuit 
wishes to analogize the obviousness determination to the negli-
gence determination,243 then it must treat the obviousness deter-
mination as a question of fact. 
Second, although the issue of obviousness—like negligence—is 
an “ultimate fact,”244 such an ultimate fact is not automatically a 
question of law.245 In a negligence cause of action, the issue of 
whether the defendant engaged in negligent conduct is a question 
of ultimate fact.246 And this ultimate fact “reduces to a series of 
purely factual determinations.”247 Such determinations include “a 
determination of the burden of precautions, the magnitude of the 
injury, the likelihood that the injury would occur if the defendant 
failed to take the precautions, and the relation among these va-
riables, all of which are factual, and their relation to each other 
likewise.”248 
Similarly, the obviousness determination is an ultimate fact.249 
It embodies the “ultimate issue for resolution,”250 “implies the 
                                                                                                                            
241 Id. 
242 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402 (1990); Thomas v. Gen. 
Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307–08 (7th Cir. 2002); CHILDRESS & DAVIS, 
supra note 1, § 2.28, at 2-173; Chen, supra note 117, at 89; Childress, supra note 104, at 
186; Jens H. Hillen, Note, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Independent Review 
of Patent Decisions and the Constitutional Facts Doctrine, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 187, 196 n.45 
(1993); cf. United States v. Ford Motor Co., 463 F.3d 1286, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(“Because a determination of gross negligence involves a determination of intent, it is an 
issue of fact, not law.”). 
243 Indeed, this analogy is a good one, in the author’s opinion. 
244 See United States v. Esnault-Pelterie, 299 U.S. 201, 205 (1936) (“Validity and 
infringement are ultimate facts on which depends the question of liability.” (emphasis 
added)). For a discussion of ultimate facts, see supra notes 114–21 and accompanying text. 
245 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982). 
246 Thomas, 288 F.3d at 308. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 See Esnault-Pelterie, 299 U.S. at 205. 
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application of standards of law,”251 involves the “characterization 
of historical facts,”252 is “outcome-determinative,”253 and—just 
like the negligence determination—“reduces to a series of purely 
factual determinations.”254 These factual determinations255 are 
analogous to the factual determinations involved in the issue of 
negligent conduct. But this reasoning runs counter to the Federal 
Circuit’s assertion in Panduit that if the obviousness determination 
is “itself a fact, it would be part of its own foundation.”256 There-
fore, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s holding that the obviousness 
determination is a question of law based on factual underpin-
nings,257 the obviousness determination is really an ultimate fact 
that incorporates “a series of purely factual determinations”258—
just like the negligence determination.259 And, like the negligence 
determination, the obviousness determination should be a question 
of fact.260 
                                                                                                                            
250 Childress, supra note 104, at 142 (quoting East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 339 
(5th Cir. 1975)). 
251 Schwarzer et al., supra note 111, at 456–57. 
252 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
253 Id. 
254 Thomas, 288 F.3d at 308. 
255 These factual determinations include: 
[1] what a prior art patent as a whole discloses; [2] what it in fact 
disclosed to workers in the art; [3] what differences exist between the 
entire prior art, or a whole prior art structure, and the whole claimed 
invention; [4] what the differences enabled the claimed subject matter 
as a whole to achieve; [5] that others for years sought and failed to 
arrive at the claimed invention; [6] that one of those others copied it; 
[7] that the invention met on its merits with outstanding commercial 
success. 
Panduit v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Thomas, 288 F.3d at 308. 
259 See id.; Hillen, supra note 242, at 196 n.45 (noting that the Federal Circuit has made 
the “opposite choice” from negligence law in holding that the ultimate question of 
obviousness is a question of law “where the distinction between foundational facts and 
ultimate conclusions so closely parallels the analogous tort doctrine”). 
260 See Beutler, supra note 49, at 466 (noting the argument that “patent law should be 
treated no differently than any other area of the law and that to limit a jury’s role in the 
legal question of obviousness is inappropriate, since there is no reason to limit a jury’s 
participation in questions of law outside the patent realm”). 
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Finally, the Federal Circuit incorrectly reasoned that obvious-
ness should be a question of law to “facilitate a consistent applica-
tion of that statute in the courts and in the Patent and Trademark 
Office.”261 First, treating obviousness as a question of law would 
not lead to a consistent application of obviousness law in the 
courts. Courts are no more experts at making an obviousness de-
termination than juries. Typical district-court judges—like typical 
jurors—do not have an engineering or science background. And 
even most of the judges of the Federal Circuit do not have engi-
neering or science backgrounds.262 Therefore, leaving the decision 
of obviousness to the Federal Circuit does not necessarily promote 
uniformity among courts. Moreover, any time the Federal Circuit 
holds that a patent claim is invalid for obviousness under a de novo 
standard of review, the court necessarily disagrees with the deter-
mination of the Patent Office that the claim in question was patent-
able. Thus, treating the ultimate issue of obviousness as a question 
of law does nothing to “facilitate a consistent application of [the 
obviousness] statute . . . in the Patent and Trademark Office” ei-
ther.263 
B. The Supreme Court’s Statement in Graham that the Ultimate 
Question of Obviousness Is One of Law Is Not Properly Supported 
by Precedent 
In holding that the ultimate question of obviousness is a ques-
tion of law, the Federal Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of the issue as a question of law in Graham v. John Deere 
Co. of Kansas City.264 But the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Gra-
ham is merely a conclusory statement that rests on shaky 
                                                                                                                            
261 Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1567; Casey et al., supra note 3, at 320 (quoting Panduit, 810 
F.2d at 1567); see also Hillen, supra note 242, at 216–17 (arguing that the Federal Circuit 
should review obviousness with no deference to help promote consistency in patent law). 
262 See Field, Hyperactive Judges, supra note 15, at 647 n.125. 
263 Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1567. 
264 383 U.S. 1 (1966); Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1567. In Panduit, the Federal Circuit further 
noted that this statement was consistent with the Court’s answer to the obviousness 
question in Graham “because the validity issue in Graham turned on that answer and 
because [the Court] disagreed with conclusions reached below, did not remand, described 
no finding as ‘clearly erroneous,’ and did not mention Rule 52(a).” Panduit, 810 F.2d at 
1567. 
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precedent.265 In Graham, the Court stated that “the ultimate ques-
tion of patent validity is one of law,” citing a 1950 case, Great At-
lantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., as support-
ing authority.266 But this citation was not to the controlling majori-
ty opinion of Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.; instead, the Court 
cited Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion without even identify-
ing it as such.267 And because it is a concurring opinion, it does not 
have the precedential value that a majority opinion has.268 
Moreover, even if the concurring opinion in Great Atlantic & 
Pacific Tea Co. had any precedential value, it would still be weak 
precedent.269 The sentence of Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. that 
the Court cited in Graham states: “The standard of patentability is 
a constitutional standard; and the question of validity of a patent is 
a question of law.”270 In his concurrence, Justice Douglas cited on-
ly one authority to support this statement: Mahn v. Harwood.271 But 
Mahn fails to support Justice Douglas’s proposition that invalidity 
for obviousness is a question of law because the issue decided in 
Mahn was quite different than the issue decided in Great Atlantic & 
Pacific Tea Co.272 
                                                                                                                            
265 See Bradley G. Lane, Note, A Proposal to View Patent Claim Nonobviousness from the 
Policy Perspective of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(A), 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1157, 
1169–72 (1987) (characterizing the precedent that underlies the Supreme Court’s 
statement in Graham that invalidity is a question of law as “very weak”). 
266 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. 
Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 155 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring)). 
267 Id. 
268 See 21 C.J.S. Courts § 189 (2016) (“A concurring opinion, while persuasive, is not 
binding, and does not constitute authority under the doctrine of stare decisis, or have any 
precedential value.” (footnotes omitted)). 
269 See Lane, supra note 265, at 1170–71 (criticizing Justice Douglas’s reliance on Mahn 
v. Harwood for the proposition that an appellate court owes no deference to a district 
court’s conclusion on obviousness). 
270 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 155 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
271 Id. (citing Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 358 (1884)). 
272 See Lane, supra note 265, at 1171 (describing how “Mahn stands for the proposition 
that the federal district courts may adjudicate the validity of issued and reissued patents 
in an infringement action free of the factual determinations made by a patent examiner” 
rather than the standard of review an appellate court should apply when reviewing a 
district court’s conclusion on invalidity for obviousness). 
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In Mahn, obviousness was not at issue—what was at issue was 
the validity of a reissue patent273 in which the claims were broa-
dened.274 The Court affirmed the circuit court’s holding that the 
reissue claims were invalid.275 The Court reasoned that laches ap-
plied because the patentee waited too long to apply for a broadened 
reissue patent.276 In reaching this decision, the Court held: 
[T]he question whether the application for correc-
tion and reissue is or is not made within reasonable 
time is, in most, if not all, of such cases, a question 
which the court can determine as a question of law 
by comparing the patent itself with the original pa-
tent, and, if necessary, with the record of its incep-
tion.277 
This issue is quite different than obviousness, so the holding of 
Mahn fails to support Justice Douglas’s assertion that obviousness 
must be a question of law.278 
And even if the issues in Mahn and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea 
Co. were similar enough to compel the same conclusion—i.e., that 
because the application of laches to a reissue patent was a question 
                                                                                                                            
273 The process of having a patent reissued allows a patentee “to correct a patent that 
is . . . wholly or partly inoperative or invalid.” 4A-15 CHISUM, supra note 154, § 15.01. 
Under today’s law, one way in which a patent can be defective is if the claims are too 
narrow, thus “failing to protect the full scope of the invention.” Id. And today’s law 
freely permits such a broadening reissue if it meets all the other requirements and is 
applied for within two years of the original issue date. 35 U.S.C. § 251(d) (2012). But, in 
1884, when Mahn was decided, “a long series of Supreme Court decisions [had] placed 
limits on reissues that broadened the scope of the original claims.” 4A-15 CHISUM, supra 
note 154, § 15.02. Indeed, the law at the time that Mahn was decided allowed a 
broadening reissue only if the patentee filed the reissue application without any significant 
delay such that the defense of laches would not apply. Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 
356 (1881) (“But in reference to reissues made for the purpose of enlarging the scope of 
the patent, the rule of laches should be strictly applied; and no one should be relieved who 
has slept upon his rights, and has thus led the public to rely on the implied disclaimer 
involved in the terms of the original patent.”). 
274 Mahn, 112 U.S. at 357 (“[T]he only object of the reissue was to enlarge the 
claims . . . . Nothing was altered, nothing was changed, but to multiply the claims and to 
make them broader.”). 
275 Id. at 363–64. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. at 360 (emphasis added). 
278 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 155 (1950) 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
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of law, obviousness must also be a question of law—this holding 
also does not support Justice Douglas’s assertion. The Mahn hold-
ing is merely that the Court could decide that particular case as a 
matter of law—not that it could decide all cases involving laches 
and reissue applications as a matter of law.279 Thus, the Court’s 
holding really was that the laches issue in Mahn was a question of 
law because the facts were not in dispute.280 Today, this case would 
allow a court to issue summary judgment281 or a judgment as a mat-
ter of law282 because the facts were not in dispute and no reasona-
ble juror could hold otherwise. 
But Justice Douglas did not actually cite this holding; instead, 
he cited the following dictum283 from Mahn: 
In cases of patents for inventions, a valid defense . . . 
often arises where the question is whether the thing 
patented amounts to a patentable invention.284 This 
being a question of law, the courts are not bound by the 
decision of the commissioner, although he must neces-
sarily pass upon it.285 
This statement does not support Justice Douglas’s assertion 
that in reviewing a trial court’s holding in an infringement lawsuit, 
validity is a question of law. Instead, this statement in Mahn merely 
means that a trial court may review a patentability determination of 
the PTO without deference to the Office’s factual findings.286 
                                                                                                                            
279 See Mahn, 112 U.S. at 360 (holding that this issue could be decided as a question of 
law “in most, if not all, of such cases” (emphasis added)). 
280 In other words, this case would allow a court today to issue summary judgment, see 
FED. R. CIV. P. 56, or a judgment as a matter of law, see FED. R. CIV. P. 50, because the 
facts were not in dispute. 
281 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
282 See FED. R. CIV. P. 50. 
283 Lane, supra note 265, at 1171 (“[T]he portion of Mahn cited by Justice Douglas may 
be dictum.”). 
284 This question today would be called one of nonobviousness. See Graham v. John 
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14 (1966) (describing that before Congress enacted § 103 of the 
1952 Patent Act, the analogous test to nonobviousness was the judicially created 
“invention” requirement (citing S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 6 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, 
at 7 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394)). 
285 Mahn, 112 U.S. at 358 (emphasis added), cited in Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., v. 
Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 155 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
286 Lane, supra note 265, at 1171 (“Mahn stands for the proposition that the federal 
district courts may adjudicate the validity of issued and reissued patents in an 
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Thus, the statement that Justice Douglas cited does not support his 
assertion that patent validity must be a question of law. 
Furthermore, at the time that the Supreme Court decided Gra-
ham, other Supreme Court authority existed that held that validity 
was a question of fact.287 Indeed, Mahn was the only case available 
that even hinted that validity was a question of law.288 At least 
three other pre-Graham cases stated that validity was a question of 
fact.289 For example, in 1924, the Court very clearly stated in 
Thomson Spot Welder Co. v. Ford Motor Co. that “[t]he question 
whether an improvement requires mere mechanical skill or the ex-
ercise of the faculty of invention, is one of fact; and in an action at 
law for infringement is to be left to the determination of the 
jury.”290 Thus, when Graham was decided in 1966, the number of 
cases stating that validity was a question of fact outnumbered those 
stating that it was a question of law by a ratio of at least three to 
one.291 
C. Treating Obviousness as a Question of Law Is Inconsistent with 
How the Federal Circuit Treats Anticipation and Infringement 
Treating obviousness as a question of law is inconsistent with 
how the Federal Circuit treats two related doctrines: anticipation 
and infringement. The court treats the ultimate question of wheth-
er a patent claim is invalid for anticipation292 as a question of 
                                                                                                                            
infringement action free of the factual determinations made by a patent examiner.” 
(footnotes omitted)). This principle of law is the same today. Id. (citing Lindeman 
Maschinenfabrik GmBH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick, Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1460 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 
1984)). 
287 Id. at 1170 n.77. 
288 Id. at 1170. 
289 Id. at 1170 n.77; see Dow Chem. Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 324 
U.S. 320, 322 (1945) (“The conflicting views of the appellate courts concerning the 
validity of the . . . patent led us to grant certiorari in this case, and oblige us to decide 
independently the factual issue of validity.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); United 
States v. Esnault-Pelterie, 299 U.S. 201, 205 (1936) (“Validity and infringement are 
ultimate facts on which depends the question of liability.” (emphasis added)); Thomson 
Spot Welder Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 265 U.S. 445, 446 (1924). 
290 265 U.S. at 446 (emphasis added). The issue of “invention” in Thomson is analogous 
to the issue of obviousness today under § 103. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 
14 (1966). 
291 Lane, supra note 265, at 1170 n.77. 
292 For a discussion of anticipation, see supra Section I.A. 
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fact.293 The court also treats infringement—both literal and under 
the doctrine of equivalents—as a question of fact.294 The obvious-
ness determination is similar, or at least analogous, to the determi-
nation of anticipation and infringement, yet the court treats ob-
viousness as a question of law. Section I.C.1 discusses anticipation 
and obviousness, and Section I.C.2 examines infringement and ob-
viousness. 
1. Anticipation and Obviousness 
Although anticipation and obviousness are different grounds 
for invalidating a patent claim,295 they share important similarities 
such that they should both be treated as questions of fact. Namely, 
they both involve the determination of what a hypothetical 
PHOSITA would think.296 Thus, because anticipation is a question 
of fact, obviousness should likewise be a question of fact. 
Anticipation is properly a question of fact because it is essen-
tially a question of historical fact—whether the prior-art reference 
                                                                                                                            
293 See, e.g., Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 726 F.3d 1306, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 
2013). Courts have treated anticipation as a question of fact since at least the nineteenth 
century. See Magin v. Karle, 150 U.S. 387, 391 (1893) (treating anticipation as a question 
of fact); Haines v. McLaughlin, 135 U.S. 584, 597 (1890) (quoting with approval a jury 
instruction stating that “[t]he question of anticipation is purely a question of fact, and is 
exclusively for the jury to determine”). 
294 See, e.g., Cadence Pharm. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc., 780 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). 
295 A determination that a patent claim is invalid for anticipation means that the Patent 
Office should not have issued the claim because it failed to meet the novelty requirement 
of 35 U.S.C. § 102. See, e.g., MUELLER, supra note 17, at 697 (defining “anticipation”); id. 
at 706 (defining “novelty”). But a determination that a claim is invalid for obviousness 
means that the Patent Office should not have issued the claim because it failed to meet the 
nonobviousness requirement of § 103. See, e.g., id. (defining “nonobviousness”). For a 
discussion of anticipation and obviousness, see supra Sections I.A–B. 
296 Compare Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (“[I]nvalidity by anticipation requires that the four corners of a single, prior 
art document describe every element of the claimed invention, either expressly or 
inherently, such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could practice the invention 
without undue experimentation.” (emphasis added)), with Senju Pharm. Co. v. Lupin 
Ltd., 780 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“An obviousness inquiry assesses ‘the 
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art’ to 
ascertain whether ‘the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter 
pertains.’” (emphasis added) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006))). 
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in question discloses each and every limitation of the claim at is-
sue.297 Indeed, anticipation is a highly technical issue.298 Therefore, 
the Federal Circuit properly treats anticipation as a question of 
fact299 reviewed under either the clearly erroneous300 or substan-
tial-evidence301 standard, as appropriate. 
In contrast, as discussed above,302 instead of being a “four-
corners” type defense like anticipation,303 the crux of the obvious-
ness analysis is objective and relates to the hypothetical 
PHOSITA.304 The fact finder must determine obviousness by re-
ferring to this PHOSITA and answering the question of whether 
the claimed invention would have been obvious to a PHOSITA be-
fore the effective filing date.305 
But anticipation and obviousness are similar in that they both 
require the fact finder to refer to a hypothetical PHOSITA. In an-
ticipation, the question of whether a patent claim is invalid is 
whether “the four corners of a single, prior art document describe 
every element of the claimed invention, either expressly or inhe-
rently, such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could practice 
the invention without undue experimentation.”306 Thus, if antici-
pation is a question of fact even though it requires the fact finder to 
make a factual determination as to what a hypothetical PHOSITA 
would think, then obviousness is not foreclosed from being a ques-
tion of fact even though it, too, requires the fact finder to make a 
factual determination as to what a hypothetical PHOSITA would 
think. 
                                                                                                                            
297 Krippelz v. Ford Motor Co., 667 F.3d 1261, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
298 See Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 708 F.2d 151, 154 (5th Cir. 
1983) (“The defense of anticipation, derived principally from § 102(a), is strictly 
technical, requiring a showing of actual identity in the prior art.” (footnote omitted)). 
299 Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 726 F.3d 1306, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
300 Id. 
301 Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
302 See supra Section I.B (discussing the issue of invalidity due to obviousness). 
303 See Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (“[I]nvalidity by anticipation requires that the four corners of a single, prior art 
document describe every element of the claimed invention . . . .”). 
304 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) 
(citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15–18 (1966)). 
305 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. 
306 Advanced Display, 212 F.3d at 1282 (emphasis added). 
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2. Infringement and Obviousness 
Parallels exist between infringement307 and obviousness such 
that because infringement is a question of fact,308 obviousness 
should also be a question of fact. Determining whether the accused 
infringer practiced the patentee’s actual “patented invention” and 
thus infringed requires a two-step analysis.309 First, “the court de-
termines the scope and meaning of the patent claims as-
serted . . . .”310 Second, the fact finder “compares the claims to the 
allegedly infringing device[].”311 If this comparison reveals that 
each and every limitation of the claimed invention is met by the 
accused device, then the device literally infringes the claim in ques-
tion.312 
But even if the accused device does not literally infringe, it 
nonetheless may infringe under the doctrine of equivalents.313 The 
existence of the doctrine of equivalents “ensures that the scope of 
a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces all 
equivalents to the claims described.”314 The Supreme Court origi-
nally created the doctrine of equivalents “to prevent competitors 
from avoiding infringement by making unimportant and insubstan-
tial differences to their technology.”315 Another important policy 
rationale supporting the doctrine of equivalents is that claim lan-
guage may be incapable of “captur[ing] every nuance of the inven-
tion or describe[ing] with complete precision the range of its novel-
ty.”316 To show infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the 
                                                                                                                            
307 Patent infringement occurs when someone “without authority makes, uses, offers to 
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United 
States any patented invention . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
308 See, e.g., Cadence Pharm. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc., 780 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). 
309 Grober v. Mako Products, Inc., 686 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
310 Id. (quoting Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
311 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1454). 
312 Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
313 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 
(2002). 
314 Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D 
Printing, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319, 1368 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Festo, 535 U.S. at 732). 
315 Id. 
316 Festo, 535 U.S. at 731. 
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patentee must prove that each and every claim limitation is either 
“literally or equivalently present in the accused device.”317 As 
mentioned above, both literal infringement and infringement under 
the doctrine of equivalents are questions of fact.318 
Determinations of literal infringement and anticipation are mir-
ror images of each other with respect to time. As the maxim goes: 
“That which would literally infringe if later in time anticipates if 
earlier than the date of the invention.”319 Indeed, the test for antic-
ipation “is the same test as for literal infringement.”320 For antici-
pation, the fact finder must look backward from the issue date of 
the patent and determine whether a reference that came before the 
patent discloses each and every limitation of the claim at issue.321 
And for literal infringement, the fact finder must look forward from 
the issue date of the patent and determine whether an accused de-
vice, composition, method, or manufacture meets each and every 
limitation of the claim at issue.322 Because the tests for anticipation 
                                                                                                                            
317 Energy Transp. Grp., Inc. v. William Demant Holding A/S, 697 F.3d 1342, 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc. 126 F.3d 1420, 1423 
(Fed. Cir. 1997)). To show that a limitation is present equivalently, the patentee must 
prove that the element of the device is insubstantially different from the corresponding 
claim limitation. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 
(1997). The insubstantial-differences test “simply asks whether there is a substantial 
difference between an element of the patented product and the accused product.” 
Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 314, at 1368. And one way in which the patentee can show 
that the element is insubstantially different is by showing that the element performs 
substantially the same function, substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the 
same result as the corresponding claim limitation. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39; 
Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 314, at 1368. For a discussion of the doctrine of 
equivalents, see generally MUELLER, supra note 17, at 468–77. 
318 Cadence Pharm. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc., 780 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
319 Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (emphasis 
omitted); accord, e.g., Alan L. Durham, Patent Symmetry, 87 B.U. L. REV. 969, 994 (2007) 
(“A rule of thumb known to every student of patent law is that whatever literally infringes 
a patent if it comes later in time, anticipates if it came before.”); Michael T. Siekman, The 
Expanded Hypothetical Claim Test: A Better Test for Infringement for Biotechnology Patents 
Under the Doctrine of Equivalents, 2 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 6, ¶ 11 (1996). This principle 
dates back to at least the nineteenth century. See Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 
537 (1889) (“That which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if earlier.”). 
320 Siekman, supra note 319, ¶ 11 (emphasis omitted) (quoting DONALD S. CHISUM & 
MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 2C[3][a] at 2-54 
(1992)). 
321 See Krippelz v. Ford Motor Co., 667 F.3d 1261, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
322 See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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and literal infringement are the same,323 and because the determi-
nations involved are factual in nature, it makes sense that the Fed-
eral Circuit treats both of these issues as questions of fact.324 
Although the determinations of infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents and obviousness are not exact mirror images of 
each other with respect to time,325 these determinations are none-
theless analogous326 and should be treated consistently—as ques-
tions of fact.327 Indeed, as one commentator described: 
Obviousness is a snare for the patentee; equivalence 
the bane of an accused infringer. Yet the two con-
cepts have much in common. Each extends around a 
more definite entity a ghostly penumbra of legal sig-
nificance. Obviousness expands the obstacles to pa-
tentability posed by the disclosures of the prior art; 
equivalence broadens the reach of the patent beyond 
what the patentee explicitly claimed.328 
                                                                                                                            
323 Siekman, supra note 319, ¶ 11 (emphasis omitted) (quoting CHISUM & JACOBS, supra 
note 320). 
324 See Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1214. 
325 Durham, supra note 319, at 970. “The courts . . . have preserved the distinction” 
between the doctrine of equivalents and obviousness. Id. “A product infringes by 
equivalence . . . not because it is an obvious variation of the claimed invention, but 
because the differences are ‘insubstantial.’” Id. But see Siekman, supra note 319, ¶ 11 
(“The interplay between the doctrine of equivalents and obviousness can be summarized 
by the maxim ‘that which infringes under the doctrine of equivalents, if later, would 
render obvious, if earlier.’”). 
326 See Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[T]he 
doctrine of equivalents . . . , if one wished to draw a parallel, is somewhat akin to 
obviousness.”); Durham, supra note 319, at 970 (“[T]he two concepts [of obviousness 
and infringement under the doctrine of equivalents] have much in common.”); Siekman, 
supra note 319, ¶ 11. One commentator has explored treating the determinations under 
the doctrine of equivalents and obviousness symmetrically. See generally Durham, supra 
note 319. In other words, “if ‘nonobvious’ changes are enough to distinguish a patentable 
invention from the prior art, then further ‘nonobvious’ changes should be enough to 
avoid infringing the patent.” Id. at 969 (emphasis omitted). 
327 Hillen, supra note 242, at 198 n.53 (“The striking similarity between the so-called 
‘doctrine of equivalence’ [sic] and the obviousness inquiry leads one to wonder how the 
doctrine of equivalence [sic] could be a ‘determination of fact,’ dictating deference to the 
trial court’s findings, while obviousness is a legal inquiry open to [plenary] appellate 
review.” (citation omitted)). 
328 Durham, supra note 319, at 970. 
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Importantly, the ultimate determinations for both infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents and invalidity for obviousness 
involve the PHOSITA.329 The question for obviousness is whether 
the claimed invention would have been obvious to a hypothetical 
PHOSITA.330 Similarly, the question for infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents is whether a PHOSITA would recognize 
that an element of the accused device was only insubstantially dif-
ferent from the corresponding claim limitation.331 Although these 
determinations are not identical,332 they do not differ from each 
other in any meaningful way with respect to whether they are ques-
tions of law and fact. Both determinations are factual in nature. 
The Federal Circuit treats infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents as a question of fact.333 Therefore, the court should also 
treat the analogous obviousness determination as a question of fact. 
D. Even Though Obviousness Is Supposed to Be a Question of Law, 
District Courts Nonetheless Treat the Issue as a De Facto Question 
of Fact 
Although it is supposedly well settled that the ultimate question 
of obviousness is supposed to be a question of law for the court,334 
district courts nonetheless routinely treat the issue as if it were one 
of fact for the jury. Indeed, the Federal Circuit expressly allows dis-
trict courts to submit the issue of obviousness to juries.335 In doing 
                                                                                                                            
329 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); see Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 
F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); 2-5 
CHISUM, supra note 154, § 5.04 (obviousness). 
330 § 103; see 2-5 CHISUM, supra note 154, § 5.04. 
331 See Lighting World, 382 F.3d at 1357. And “the requirement that equivalence be 
evaluated from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art applies whether 
equivalence is measured by the ‘function-way-result’ test or by the ‘insubstantial 
differences’ test.” Id. 
332 Durham, supra note 319, at 970. 
333 Cadence Pharm. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc., 780 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
334 Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
335 Theresa Weisenberger, Note, An “Absence of Meaningful Appellate Review”: Juries 
and Patent Obviousness, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 641, 659 (2010) (“While the 
obviousness determination is a legal one, the Federal Circuit allows the court to submit 
this issue to the jury and rejects the notion that these verdicts are merely advisory.” 
(footnote omitted) (citing McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1356 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893 (Fed. Cir. 
1984))). 
606          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:555 
 
so, the district court may decide to (1) submit the entire issue of 
obviousness to the jury to issue a general verdict concerning ob-
viousness,336 or (2) submit only the factual underpinnings of ob-
viousness337 to the jury and require the jury to answer special inter-
rogatories concerning these factual underpinnings.338 If the ulti-
mate question of obviousness were a de facto and de jure question 
of law, then this second option should be common. But an exami-
nation of recent Federal Circuit opinions has revealed that this 
second option is relatively rare. Instead, in the vast majority of re-
cent Federal Circuit cases that review obviousness judgments in-
volving jury findings, district courts chose the first option and sent 
the ultimate issue of obviousness to the jury for a general verdict. 
In so doing, these courts have treated the ultimate issue of ob-
viousness as a de facto question of fact rather than a question of 
law, and the Federal Circuit has routinely allowed them to do so. 
                                                                                                                            
336 See, e.g., InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014) (reviewing a district court’s judgment of obviousness where the district court 
submitted the entire issue of obviousness to the jury); see also Weisenberger, supra note 
335, at 660–62 (describing how the Federal Circuit reviews jury verdicts of obviousness 
where the jury has issued a general verdict). Where a district court allows the jury to 
render a general verdict concerning the ultimate issue of obviousness, the Federal Circuit 
reviews the district court’s judgment by “first presum[ing] that the jury resolved the 
underlying factual disputes in favor of the verdict.” InTouch Techs., 751 F.3d at 1339. The 
Federal Circuit then “leave[s] those presumed findings undisturbed if they are supported 
by substantial evidence.” Id. Finally, the Federal Circuit “examine[s] the [ultimate] legal 
conclusion [of obviousness] de novo to see whether it is correct in light of the presumed 
jury fact findings.” Id. (second and third alterations in original) (citing Kinetic Concepts, 
Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also, e.g., 
Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark Pharm. Inc., USA, 748 F.3d 1354, 1358 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“When the question of obviousness is tried to a jury, on appeal we 
ascertain whether the jury was correctly instructed on the law, whether there was 
substantial evidence in support of factual findings necessary to the verdict, and whether 
the verdict was correct on the supported facts. The court must ‘accept implicit factual 
findings upon which the legal conclusion is based when they are supported by substantial 
evidence.’” (quoting Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1359)). The Federal Circuit upholds 
“[a] general jury verdict of invalidity . . . if there was sufficient evidence to support any of 
the alternative theories of invalidity.” InTouch Techs., 751 F.3d at 1346. 
337 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007); Graham v. John Deere 
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). For a detailed discussion of the obviousness determination, 
see supra Section I.B. 
338 I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., 576 F. App’x 982, 985 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam) 
(reviewing a district court’s judgment of nonobviousness where the district court 
submitted the factual issues to the jury and then determined the ultimate issue of 
obviousness itself based on the jury’s factual findings), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 54 (2015). 
2017] OBVIOUSNESS AS FACT 607 
 
For this Article, the author examined the Federal Circuit’s 
opinions from 2013 to 2015 in which juries considered the issue of 
obviousness.339 There were twenty-four such opinions, both prece-
dential and non-precedential.340 Interestingly, in twenty-one of 
                                                                                                                            
339 The author searched the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CTAF”) 
database on Westlaw using the following search: “obvious! & patent & jury,” restricted 
to the years 2013 through 2015. After performing this search, the author reviewed the 
results and discarded each false positive—i.e., each case in which the Federal Circuit did 
not actually review a jury’s determination of obviousness in a district court infringement 
action.  
In no way does the author intend this examination of Federal Circuit opinions to be 
any sort of rigorous empirical analysis. Indeed, the data gathered here suffers from serious 
limitations. First, the sample size here is quite small—only twenty-four cases in total. 
Second, the time period sampled is quite small—only three years. Third, the author 
examined only opinions available on Westlaw—thus, the author was not able to take 
summary affirmances into account in any way. Fourth and finally, the author examined 
only Federal Circuit opinions—the author did not examine any district court opinions. An 
extensive examination of district court opinions might yield more interesting results, but 
such an empirical study is beyond the intended scope of this Article. 
340 Of the twenty-four opinions, sixteen were precedential opinions, and eight were non-
precedential opinions. There were four precedential cases from 2015. See ABT Sys., LLC 
v. Emerson Elec. Co., 797 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell 
Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Circuit Check Inc. v. QXQ Inc., 795 
F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015); MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., 780 F.3d 1159 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 270 (2015). And there was one non-precedential case 
from 2015. See Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 611 F. App’x 693 (Fed. Cir. 
2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2483 (2016).  
There were five precedential cases from 2014. See Fleming v. Escort Inc., 774 F.3d 
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. 
granted, 136 S. Ct. 356 (2015), vacated sub nom. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 
S. Ct. 1923 (2016); SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 769 F.3d 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2014); 
InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Sanofi-
Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark Pharm. Inc., USA, 748 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). And there was one non-precedential case from 2014. See I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL 
Inc., 576 F. App’x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 54 (2015). 
For 2013, there were seven precedential cases. See Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex 
Corp., 732 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2013); St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Access Closure, Inc., 729 
F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Alexsam, Inc. v. IDT Corp., 715 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013); 
Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 
2013); SynQor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 709 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Function 
Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Soverain Software LLC v. 
Newegg Inc., 705 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir.), amended on reh’g, 728 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
And there were six non-precedential cases from 2013. See Lee v. Mike’s Novelties, Inc., 
543 F. App’x 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 539 F. App’x 1000 
(Fed. Cir. 2013); Metso Minerals, Inc. v. Powerscreen Int’l Distribution, Ltd., 526 F. 
App’x 988 (Fed. Cir. 2013); CEATS, Inc. v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 526 F. App’x 966 (Fed. 
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these twenty-four opinions, the district courts and the Federal Cir-
cuit effectively treated the ultimate issue of obviousness as a ques-
tion of fact, not as a question of law.341 
For example, Alexsam, Inc. v. IDT Corp. is typical of how dis-
trict courts and the Federal Circuit treat obviousness as a de facto 
question of fact.342 In Alexsam, the district court gave the issue of 
obviousness to the jury, which found that the asserted claims were 
not invalid for obviousness.343 There is no mention anywhere in the 
Federal Circuit’s opinion that the district-court judge treated the 
issue as a question of law and only used the jury to find the underly-
ing Graham facts.344 Instead, the district court allowed the jury to 
make the ultimate determination that the asserted claims were not 
invalid for obviousness.345 And although the Federal Circuit stated 
in its opinion that the ultimate issue of obviousness is a question of 
law depending on underlying facts,346 the court nonetheless re-
viewed the jury’s decision that the claims were not invalid for ob-
viousness as if this issue were a question of fact.347 In doing so, the 
court held that there was substantial evidence that supported the 
jury’s finding of non-invalidity,348 as would be typical in a review of 
a purely factual question.349 The court then affirmed the jury’s de-
                                                                                                                            
Cir. 2013); Harris Corp. v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 502 F. App’x 957 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Accentra, 
Inc. v. Staples, Inc., 500 F. App’x 922 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
341 The court did not effectively treat the issue as a question of fact in only three cases. 
See ABT Sys., 797 F.3d at 1357; I/P Engine, 576 F. App’x at 986; Soverain Software, 705 
F.3d at 1336. 
342 715 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
343 Id. at 1341. 
344 See id. at 1340–41, 1346–48. 
345 See id. 
346 Id. at 1346. 
347 See id. at 1346–48. 
348 Id. 
349 See MOORE ET. AL., supra note 94, § 206.02. In general, when reviewing a jury 
verdict, a reviewing court must affirm the verdict if the record shows that substantial 
evidence supports the verdict. Id. The rules for applying this substantial-evidence review 
are as follows: 
The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence or reassess the 
credibility of witnesses. Rather, it must view all the evidence, all 
reasonable inferences, and all credibility determinations in the light 
most favorable to the verdict. If, in that light, the evidence is such that 
a rational finder of fact could come to the same conclusion, then there 
is sufficient evidence to support the verdict. 
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cision because it concluded that “[s]ubstantial evidence . . . sup-
ports the jury’s finding that [the asserted] claims . . . are not 
invalid.”350 Such a review is no different than how the court re-
views what it considers to be a pure issue of fact.351 
The Federal Circuit treated the ultimate question of obvious-
ness as a question of law in only two of the twenty-four cases ex-
amined,352 and these cases stand out as examples of where the 
court followed its de jure rule that obviousness is a question of law 
rather than its de facto rule that treats obviousness as a question of 
fact. One of these cases was ABT Systems, LLC v. Emerson Electric 
Co., in which the district court allowed the jury to determine the 
issue of obviousness, and the jury found that the claims at issue 
were not invalid for obviousness.353 In response, the accused in-
fringers filed a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law 
(“JMOL”) notwithstanding the verdict.354 The district-court judge 
denied the JMOL motion and deferred to the jury’s findings, hold-
ing that the jury could have reasonably found that the claims were 
not invalid.355 In doing so, the judge applied the substantial-
evidence rule to the jury’s verdict of nonobviousness.356 Thus, the 
                                                                                                                            
Id. (footnote omitted). 
350 Alexsam, 715 F.3d at 1348. Although Judge Mayer dissented, his dissenting opinion 
was not based at all on the issue of invalidity for obviousness. See id. at 1348–51 (Mayer, 
J., dissenting). Instead, Judge Mayer’s dissent was based on the issue of invalidity for lack 
of subject-matter eligibility. See id. 
351 See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 848–52 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 
aff’d, 564 U.S. 91 (2011). In i4i, the Federal Circuit reviewed a jury’s finding of 
infringement. Id. The court noted that a finding of “[i]nfringement is a question of fact.” 
Id. at 849. In reviewing a jury verdict of infringement, the Federal Circuit “review[ed] the 
verdict only for substantial evidence.” Id. The court then identified evidence that 
supported the jury’s verdict of infringement. Id. at 849–52. The court ultimately 
concluded that the verdict was supported by substantial evidence of contributory 
infringement, and inducement to infringe. Id. at 851–52. Thus, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the jury’s finding of infringement. Id. at 863. 
352 ABT Sys. LLC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 797 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015); I/P 
Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., 576 F. App’x 982, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 54 (2015). 
353 797 F.3d at 1352. 
354 Id. at 1353–54. 
355 Id. at 1354. 
356 Id. In reviewing a decision on a post-verdict JMOL motion, a district court must 
grant such a motion only if “the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally 
sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 
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district-court judge followed the norm in treating obviousness as a 
de facto issue of fact. 
In reviewing the judgment in ABT Systems, the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s decision to deny the JMOL motion.357 
In doing so, the Federal Circuit departed from the norm of treating 
obviousness as a de facto issue of fact, and instead treated it as a 
question of law.358 The Federal Circuit began by “assign[ing] due 
deference to the jury’s verdict” and “presume[d] that the jury re-
solved the underlying factual disputes in favor of the verdict.”359 
Taking these facts implied by the verdict in conjunction with all the 
undisputed facts, the Federal Circuit substituted its judgment for 
the jury’s and concluded that the claims were invalid for obvious-
ness.360 The court effectively emphasized that its precedent al-
lowed it to decide the ultimate question of obviousness as a ques-
tion of law: “[A] jury verdict does not mean that we are free to ab-
dicate our role as the ultimate decision maker on the question of 
obviousness. That decision remains within our province.”361 
Of the cases examined, one is unique in that instead of sending 
the issue of obviousness to the jury, the district court granted a pre-
verdict motion for JMOL that the claims at issue were not invalid 
for obviousness.362 On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that taking 
this issue from the jury did not violate the accused infringer’s right 
to a jury trial.363 The Federal Circuit then reviewed the district 
court’s grant of JMOL de novo.364 The Federal Circuit disagreed 
                                                                                                                            
50(a)). And the district court must draw “all reasonable inferences . . . in favor of the 
nonmoving party without making credibility assessments or weighing the evidence.” Id. 
(quoting Penford Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 662 F.3d 497, 503 (8th Cir. 2011)). 
357 Id. at 1357. 
358 See id. at 1362. Interestingly, the patentee characterized the accused infringer’s 
arguments that the Federal Circuit should overturn the jury’s verdict of nonobviousness 
as “an attempt to retry credibility and factual determinations made by the jury.” Id. at 
1356. 
359 Id. at 1357. 
360 Id. at 1362. 
361 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn 
Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
362 Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg Inc., 705 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir.), amended on 
reh’g, 728 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
363 Id. at 1336–37. 
364 Id. at 1337. 
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with the district-court judge’s decision and reversed, holding that 
the evidence compelled a judgment that the claims were invalid for 
obviousness.365 
Although the district court’s approach in Soverain Software 
LLC v. Newegg Inc. seemingly treated the ultimate issue of ob-
viousness as a question of law, this approach is nonetheless consis-
tent with treating the ultimate issue of obviousness as a question of 
fact. As the Federal Circuit noted in Soverain Software, a trial court 
is always free to take an issue from the jury and grant JMOL where 
“the facts are sufficiently clear that the law requires a particular 
result”366—even for an issue that is a question of fact.367 Thus, 
even if the ultimate issue of obviousness is treated as a question of 
fact, a district-court judge is free to take the issue from the jury by 
granting a pre-verdict JMOL where compelled by the facts, and a 
judge is free to grant a post-verdict JMOL where no reasonable jury 
could have reached a particular verdict.368 Under this approach, 
treating the ultimate issue of obviousness as a question of fact 
would allow courts to decide the issue as a question of law where 
compelled by the facts, while still requiring the Federal Circuit to 
defer to jury verdicts in close cases where the district court did not 
grant JMOL. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit classify this 
ultimate determination of obviousness as one of law reviewed 
without deference,369 this determination should properly be classi-
fied as one of fact and reviewed with deference. Indeed, the Feder-
al Circuit’s reasoning that the ultimate question of obviousness is 
really a question of law rather than a question of fact is flawed. 
Contrary to the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, the obviousness de-
termination does not “engage[ the] court in an exercise legal in na-
                                                                                                                            
365 Id. at 1347. 
366 Id. at 1336 (quoting Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 448 (2000)). 
367 See generally 9B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
& PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2524 (3d ed. 2016). 
368 See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 367, § 2524. 
369 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966); Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. 
Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
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ture.”370 The court correctly draws a parallel between the 
PHOSITA in obviousness law with the reasonably prudent person 
in negligence law.371 But the negligence determination is a question 
of fact,372 so the obviousness determination should also be a ques-
tion of fact. And just because obviousness is an “ultimate fact,” 
does not mean that it should not be treated as a question of fact and 
reviewed with deference.373 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s statement that the ultimate 
question of obviousness is one of law was never properly supported 
by precedent.374 And treating obviousness as a question of law is 
inconsistent with how the Federal Circuit treats other analogous 
patent-law issues, such as anticipation and infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents. Finally, even though under current law ob-
viousness is supposed to be a question of law, district courts none-
theless treat the issue as a de facto question of fact, without the ob-
jection of the Federal Circuit. Therefore, for these reasons, in an 
appropriate case, the Supreme Court should hold that the ultimate 
determination of obviousness is a question of fact to be reviewed as 
such. 
                                                                                                                            
370 Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1566. 
371 Id. 
372 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402 (1990); Thomas v. Gen. 
Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307–08 (7th Cir. 2002); CHILDRESS & DAVIS, 
supra note 1, § 2.28, at 2-173; Chen, supra note 117, at 89; Childress, supra note 104, at 
186. 
373 Cf. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982) (“Rule 52(a) . . . does not 
divide findings of fact into those that deal with ‘ultimate’ and those that deal with 
‘subsidiary’ facts.”). 
374 Lane, supra note 265, at 1169–72. 
